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Problem Description
In recent years, there have been an increased adoption of service-oriented systems. Applications
are made available as services, and this approach is commonly referred to as a service-oriented
architecture (SOA). This approach to systems development is still evolving, and one of the
challenges in adopting SOA is to ensure the security of the solution.
In this project, the student should look at SOA and the security issues that are relevant in such an
architecture. The student should identify threats and countermeasures, and give a set of security
guidelines for development of service-oriented systems. Using these guidelines, a simple and
secure SOA-based system should be designed.
Assignment given: 15. January 2008
Supervisor: Torbjørn Skramstad, IDI

Abstract
In a service-oriented architecture (SOA), parts of software applications are made
available as services. These services can be combined across multiple applica-
tions, technologies, and organizations. As a result, functionality can be more
easily reused, and new business processes can be assembled at a low cost. How-
ever, as more functionality is exposed outside of the traditional boundaries of
applications, new approaches to security are needed.
While SOA shares many of the security threats of traditional systems, the coun-
termeasures to some of these threats may differ. Most notably, eavesdropping,
data tampering, and replay attacks must be countered on the message level in
a complex SOA environment. In addition, the open and distributed nature of
SOA leads to new ways of handling authentication, authorization, logging, and
monitoring. Web Services are the most popular way of realizing SOA in prac-
tice, and make use of a set of standards such as WS-Security, XML Encryption,
XML Signature, and SAML for handling these new security approaches.
Guidelines exist for development of secure software systems, and provide rec-
ommendations for things to do or to avoid. In this thesis, I use my findings with
regard to security challenges, threats, and countermeasures to create a set of
security guidelines that should be applied during requirements engineering and
design of a SOA. Practical use of these guidelines is demonstrated by applying
them during development of a SOA-based system. This system imports personal
data into multiple administrative systems managed by UNINETT FAS, and is
designed using Web Services and XML-based security standards. Through this
practical demonstration, I show that my guidelines can be used as a reference
for making appropriate security decisions during development of a SOA.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This introductory chapter describes the background and motivation for this
thesis. The research agenda, limitations, and related work are presented, and
an outline of the report is provided.
1.1 Background and Motivation
Modern organizations have come to rely on advanced IT systems for performing
day-to-day tasks. Over time, business needs have grown, and different kinds
of applications and infrastructure have evolved [20]. This has brought a large
variety of applications into the the IT architecture of organizations. Different
applications are used in relation to different tasks, such as sales, finances, and
project management. By choosing different applications for each task, organi-
zations achieve flexibility and rapid delivery of functionality [23].
While this diverse approach enables tailoring the IT infrastructure to suit the
individual organization’s needs, it also has some problems [20]. Applications
that are developed independently of each other provide functionality that can
only be used within the boundaries of each application. In addition, differences
between platforms, programming languages, and protocols lead to technology
boundaries that can be difficult to cross. These boundaries limit the organiza-
tion’s ability to integrate and reuse functionality of its applications.
In recent years, service-oriented architectures (SOA) have emerged as a viable
option for integrating applications [22]. By supporting heterogeneity, decen-
tralization, and fault tolerance [19], SOA excels at keeping systems scalable
and flexible while growing. SOA sees IT systems as collections of units called
services. These services are built in such a way that they can be readily con-
sumed by other applications and services. This makes it possible to create new
applications by reusing services provided by other applications [20].
As parts of applications are made available as services, it becomes easier to
combine or integrate functionality of applications. However, as more function-
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ality is made available outside the internal scope of the applications, security
is affected. SOA lowers the boundaries of applications, technology, and or-
ganizations. Traditional security approaches assumed and took advantage of
these boundaries, and thus new approaches need to be used when dealing with
SOA [20].
As mentioned by Josuttis [19], building a SOA is hard, and a lot of effort is
required to help improving peoples understanding of SOA. According to Mc-
Graw [28], getting things like state and authentication right in SOA is a real
challenge. SOA introduces new approaches for dealing with security, and it is es-
pecially important that developers and IT architects have a clear understanding
of new security approaches and issues in relation to SOA. Due to the significant
growth in the development of SOA-based systems over the past decade [22],
there is a need to raise awareness of potential security issues related to SOA,
and to provide some guidelines on how to develop secure SOA-solutions.
1.2 Research Agenda
In this thesis, I will look at SOA and the security issues of such an architecture.
I will compare security in SOA with security in traditional systems, describe
relevant security standards used by SOA-based systems, and identify threats
and countermeasures that can be related to SOA. Using this information, I will
create a set of security guidelines that should be applied during requirements
engineering and design of a SOA. Finally, I will demonstrate the use of these
guidelines by designing a simple SOA-based system. This leads to the following
research questions:
1. What is a service-oriented architecture?
2. How does security in a service-oriented architecture compare to security
in traditional computing?
3. What technical security standards can be utilized in a service-oriented
architecture?
4. What threats and countermeasures can be related to a service-oriented
architecture?
5. What guidelines with regard to security should be followed during re-
quirements engineering and design of a service-oriented architecture?
6. How can a secure service-oriented architecture be designed?
I will seek to answer these questions by studying available literature on this
subject. I will answer question 6 by demonstrating how a secure SOA solution
can be designed using security guidelines.
2
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1.3 Limitations
SOA is a large subject comprising a lot of technologies and concepts. This
project is limited both in time and resources, and because of this, I have had
to add some constraints to my thesis.
The idea of a service can be implemented in multiple ways [20], and I will take
this into account in this thesis. As a result, the security guidelines that I will
present are on a high level, and do not assume any specific implementation.
However, Web Services are the most popular way of realizing services in a
SOA [19]. Because of this, I will focus on Web Services when describing the
most relevant standards for SOA and security. This is necessary to be able to
show threats and countermeasures, and to describe design of a SOA in practice.
Services in a SOA can be connected and managed using an IT infrastructure
known as Enterprise Service Bus (ESB) [20]. An ESB may provide functionality
such as routing and transformation of data that are sent between services. There
are different opinions about the exact role and responsibilities of an ESB, and
very different technical approaches are used for realizing such a facility [19].
Due to time constraints, and the many different opinions and approaches to
how an ESB is implemented, I will not describe or use ESBs in this thesis.
Several companies such as IBM, Oracle, and SAP sell SOA-solutions [19]. I will
not describe or use such commercial solutions in this thesis, as I do not have
the resources to do so. Instead, I will concentrate on open source software.
1.4 Related Work
The book SOA in Practice [19] by Nicolai M. Josuttis shows how SOA can
be created and maintained. Real-world problems of implementing and running
a SOA in practice are described. The book also touches upon the subject of
security in SOA and talks about aspects such as security requirements and how
to deal with interoperability and heterogeneity while handling security. Web
Services and their security standards are also briefly mentioned.
SOA Security [20] by Ramaro Kanneganti and Prasad Chodavarapu is a book
about SOA and its security aspects. It was published about the same time
as I started writing this thesis. Compared to Josuttis, Kanneganti and Cho-
davarapu focus more on Web Services and security standards. All standards,
both fundamental and those related to security, are described in detail. In ad-
dition, the Web Services framework Apache Axis is used for showing examples
of how the standards can be utilized in practice.
The book Building Secure Software [45] by John Viega and Gary McGraw [45]
presents a set of guidelines for developing secure software systems. These guide-
lines are applicable regardless of programming language, platform, or system
architecture.
3
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In their master’s thesis Web Application Security [12], Julie-Marie Foss and
Nina Ingvaldsen created three security guidelines that should be applied in the
context of web applications. The use of guidelines were demonstrated by devel-
oping a web application and applying their guidelines during the development
process. I will perform a similar study as Foss and Ingvaldsen, but while they
focused on web applications, I will focus on SOA.
1.5 Report Outline
This report is divided into ten chapters. In this section, I will give a brief
description of each chapter.
• Chapter 1 - Introduction
The first chapter introduces the background and motivation for this thesis.
In addition, research goals, limitations, and related work are presented.
• Chapter 2 - Service-Oriented Architecture
This chapter describes the basic concepts of service-oriented architectures.
The term ”SOA” is defined, and some advantages of using SOA is pre-
sented. At the end of this chapter, security in SOA is compared with
security in traditional systems.
• Chapter 3 - Web Services
In this chapter, Web Services are described. Web Services are the most
popular way of realizing SOA in practice [19]. Knowing how Web Services
work is essential for understanding potential threats and countermeasures
in SOA-based systems. Fundamental standards are described and one
section is devoted to security related standards.
• Chapter 4 - Threats and Countermeasures
This chapter describes threats and countermeasures that may apply to
SOA. While SOA shares many of the threats of traditional systems, the
form of attacks may be a bit different, and a few different strategies for
countering the threats are needed.
• Chapter 5 - Security Guidelines
This chapter contains my main contribution in this thesis, which is se-
curity guidelines for SOA. Before presenting the SOA-specific guidelines,
some general security guidelines are briefly mentioned. The guidelines
that I have created are intended to be used in addition to these general
guidelines.
• Chapter 6 - Requirements Engineering
In this chapter, I show how some of the guidelines in chapter 5 can be
applied when identifying requirements for a SOA-based system. A real-
world case scenario provided by UNINETT FAS is described, and threats
and countermeasures in relation to this case are identified.
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• Chapter 7 - Design
This chapter takes the findings from chapter 6 into account when design-
ing the SOA. Some of the security guidelines from chapter 5 are applied,
and appropriate standards and technologies for realizing the SOA are cho-
sen. Finally, the services of the SOA are designed and described using
figures and class diagrams.
• Chapter 8 - Discussion
In this chapter, my SOA-specific security guidelines are discussed with
regard to aspects such as their importance, ease of use, and side-effects.
In addition, I comment on some of the experiences I have had with frame-
works and libraries for Web Service development.
• Chapter 9 - Conclusion
This chapter summarizes and concludes my work.
• Chapter 10 - Further Work
This chapter discusses possible further work related to this project.
5
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Chapter 2
Service-Oriented Architecture
This chapter aims to introduce the reader to the basic concepts of service-
oriented architectures. A brief description of SOA and it advantages is provided,
and the security challenges of SOA are introduced.
2.1 Definitions and Concepts
An exact definition of the term ”service-oriented architecture”, or SOA in short,
is hard to find. This, however, does not mean that such a definition does not
exist. In fact, many different definitions of SOA exist, often depending on the
context in which the term is used. In this thesis, I will refer to the definition
given in the reference model for service-oriented architecture [25] by OASIS1:
”Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) is a paradigm for organizing
and utilizing distributed capabilities that may be under the control
of different ownership domains.”
As can be seen from the definition, SOA is a paradigm. It is not a concrete
architecture, but rather something that leads to a concrete architecture. In
other words, SOA is an approach or a way of thinking, and thus it is not some
concrete framework or tool that can be bought [19].
Even though SOA is just a paradigm, some technical concepts are often used
for describing it. As the name implies, SOA is largely based on the concept
of services. A service is an IT representation of some business functionality.
The technical details of a service should not be externally visible, and their
interfaces should be designed in such a way that business people are able to
understand them [19]. This is not only an advantage when communicating
with stakeholders, but also results in very abstract service descriptions. The
1The Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS)
drives the development, convergence, and adoption of open standards for the global informa-
tion society [32].
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result is that platform-specific details no longer matter, and that heterogeneous
systems can be more easily combined.
A common misconception regarding SOA is that Web Services (described in
chapter 3) are a necessity in the realization of a SOA. It is important to recognize
that even though services in a SOA are often implemented as Web Services,
other technologies may be used as well [20].
2.2 Terminology
Before continuing, some words need to be said about the terminology used in
this report. SOA represents a different way of thinking about software systems,
and because of this, we need to define some new terms.
The terms ”client” and ”server” are often used in relation to traditional systems.
However, their meanings in different contexts are a bit unclear. For instance,
”client” may be interpreted both as an application and a communicating party.
In addition, what do we call a server that initiates communication with another
server? Is it still a server or may it now be considered to be a client? This
gets confusing in a service-oriented architecture where many services may be
involved. Because of this, the terms ”provider” and ”consumer” are often used
when talking about services [19]:
• A provider is a system that implements a service so that other systems
can call it.
• A consumer is a system that calls a service (uses a provided service).
This terminology is illustrated by figure 2.1. The terms ”client” and ”server”
will naturally still be used on some occasions, but only in cases where their
meanings are expected to be clearly understood.
Figure 2.1: A consumer calls a service that is implemented by a provider.
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2.3 When to Adopt
SOA is not the right solution to every integration problem. Seeing the current
popularity of SOA [22], it can be tempting to use SOA even if it is not actually
appropriate. Before adopting this paradigm, one should take a good look at the
IT infrastructure and business processes of the organization and find out what
can be gained by using SOA. Josuttis [19] presents three system characteristics
that SOA is especially good at handling: Complex distributed systems, different
owners and heterogeneity:
• In complex distributed systems, entities need to locate and use the dis-
tributed capabilities that are available. SOA allows this by enabling in-
teractions between service providers and service consumers.
• When capabilities are controlled by different owners, different priorities
come into play, and one cannot expect to control everything. The prac-
tices and processes of SOA take into account that distributed systems are
not controlled by single owners.
• It is common for large systems to use different platforms and programming
languages. This heterogeneity can be difficult to deal with. SOA, however
accepts heterogeneity and supports this attribute.
Natis [31] is more specific, and mentions some major benefits of SOA. By divid-
ing capabilities into services, SOA enables incremental development and deploy-
ment of business software. This also leads to the possibility of reusing business
components, as one service can be used in multiple business processes. As ser-
vices are often available for reuse, new business processes can be assembled at
a low cost.
2.4 Security Challenges
SOA represents a new way of thinking with regard to business software. In
SOA, functionality that previously were contained in one large application can
be divided into multiple services, working together to achieve a business goal.
How does this new way of thinking affect security? I will give an answer to this
question in this section.
The traditional approach to security is well known. Let us look at an example.
One server application provides various kinds of functionality to a client appli-
cation. All this functionality can be represented as modules contained in the
server application. To be able to access one or more of these modules, the client
must to go through a security module. This module typically authenticates and
authorizes the client, and takes care of other functional aspects of security such
as protection against attacks. Figure 2.2, adopted from Kanneganti and Cho-
davarapu [20], illustrates the traditional approach to security.
9
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Figure 2.2: The traditional security approach, consisting of a single server application
that offers independent functionality to the clients. This figure was adopted from
Kanneganti and Chodavarapu [20].
The reason why this approach works is that all of the functionality is contained
inside one single application. This means that one security module is sufficient
for protecting all functional modules. However, in SOA the functional mod-
ules are not found inside one single application. The modules, or in this case
services, are spread across multiple applications running on different servers.
Figure 2.3, inspired by Kanneganti and Chodavarapu [20], illustrates a poten-
tial SOA environment.
Figure 2.3: A potential SOA environment consisting of three providers with two services
each, plus three consumers that make use of the services. The figure was inspired by
Kanneganti and Chodavarapu [20].
As can be seen from figure 2.3, a SOA environment is a bit more complex than
the server application in figure 2.2. SOA enables the possibility of recombin-
10
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ing functionality from different applications, as illustrated by Consumer 1 in
figure 2.3. Services in one enterprise can even be combined with services of part-
ners (Consumer 2 in figure 2.3). In addition, services may be invoked directly
or by partners, as shown in figure 2.3 by the call from Service p2 to Service 2b.
The many different ways of invoking services lead to a high degree of flexibility.
However, this flexibility does not come without a cost; we need a new approach
for dealing with security. Compared to the server application in figure 2.2,
SOA is more open and unpredictable. Services may be invoked by different
client applications in varying contexts. An application designer will find it
difficult to foresee all possible situations in which a service may be invoked [20].
Traditionally, a secure channel between the client and server application have
been enough to ensure data confidentiality and integrity between the two par-
ties. However, in SOA additional parties may come into play. Take for example
Consumer 3 in figure 2.3 which invokes Service p2. Parts of the message that
the consumer sends to Service p2 might be sensitive and only intended for Ser-
vice 2b. Service p2 is administrated by an external partner who should not be
able to see the sensitive information. In this case, a secure channel between
the consumer and Service p2 is not enough, as this only ensures confidentiality
during transport between the services.
When functionality is made available as services, more entrances are available
for accessing the applications. This introduces new challenges with respect
to authentication and authorization, as access control needs to be enforced in
multiple places. More entrances for users also lead to more potential places
for attackers to exploit. As a result, keeping track of all events happening in
a SOA is not as easy as in traditional single-entrance applications. Being able
to find out who or what was the reason for a security attack or a security hole
can bolster the security of a system [19]. Thus, a good strategy for handling
logging and monitoring in a SOA should be in place.
When introducing approaches for handling security, it is important to retain
the philosophy of SOA. More specifically, services should be kept as open and
easy to use as possible, and the interoperability should not suffer because of
security [20].
This has been a high-level introduction to the security challenges of SOA. In
chapter 4 I will go more into specifics about the security concerns in SOA and
how they can be addressed.
2.5 Summary
This chapter has introduced the main concepts of SOA. In addition, the main
security challenges of SOA has been described.
A definition of SOA was provided in section 2.1. It was established that SOA
is not a concrete architecture, but rather a paradigm. In other words, it is an
11
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approach or a way of thinking. In section 2.3, the benefits of using SOA were
presented. SOA is good at handling complex distributed systems, different own-
ers and heterogeneity. In addition, SOA enables reuse of business components
and assembly of new business processes at a low cost.
There are, however, a few security challenges related to SOA as described in
section 2.4. SOA is more open and unpredictable than traditional applications,
which makes it difficult to foresee all possible situations in which a service may
be invoked. Combination of services may lead to new considerations with regard
to confidentiality and integrity. In addition, services introduce more entrances
to applications, which complicates authentication and authorization, as well as
logging and monitoring.
The next chapter describes Web Services, which is a common way of realizing
service-oriented architectures.
12
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Web Services
Web Services are the most popular way of realizing SOA in practice [20]. To be
able to understand threats and countermeasures that are related to SOA, one
needs to have a basic understanding of how Web Services work. This chapter
defines what a Web Service is, and describes the most fundamental standards
used by such services. In addition, one section is devoted to security standards.
3.1 Definitions and Concepts
The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C1) uses the following definition of a
Web Service [8]:
”A Web Service is a software system designed to support inter-
operable machine-to-machine interaction over a network. It has
an interface described in a machine-processable format (specifically
WSDL). Other systems interact with the Web Service in a manner
prescribed by its description using SOAP messages, typically con-
veyed using HTTP with an XML serialization in conjunction with
other Web-related standards.”
As is evident from this definition, Web Services are realized using several spe-
cific standards which are used to enable interoperable interaction. XML plays
a major part in Web Services. A consumer and a Web Service interacts by
sending messages encoded in XML format to each other. This leads to high
interoperability, as XML data is expressed using plain text and can be pro-
cessed by almost any programming language [20]. The Simple Object Access
Protocol (SOAP) is used for sending the XML-based messages. SOAP operates
on a higher level than traditional transport protocols such as HTTP. A detailed
description of a Web Service and its operations can be found in a Web Services
1The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) develops web-related interoperable technologies
(specifications, guidelines, software, and tools) [46].
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Description Language (WSDL) document. Figure 3.1 illustrates interaction
between a consumer and a Web Service.
Figure 3.1: A consumer calls a Web Service that is implemented by a provider. The
interface of the Web Service is described using WSDL, and the two parties interact
using SOAP messages.
3.2 Fundamental Standards
W3C uses several technical concepts such as XML, WSDL, and SOAP for defin-
ing what a Web Service is. Thus, in order to understand how Web Services
work, one should be familiar with these concepts. The responsibilities and
relationships of XML, WSDL, SOAP, and HTTP are illustrated in figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: The fundamental concepts of Web Services.
At the bottom, a transport protocol is required for interacting with a Web
Service. This protocol is typically HTTP, but other protocols may be used [19].
The messages that are sent using HTTP are expressed as XML documents.
SOAP defines the structure of these documents, and WSDL describes how
a consumer may compose and send SOAP messages to a Web Service. The
following sections describe XML, WSDL, and SOAP in more detail.
3.2.1 eXtensible Markup Language (XML)
XML is the common denominator format for data exchange between Web
Services. Some basic concepts of XML, such as elements, attributes, XML
14
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Schemas, and namespaces are briefly introduced here. For a more detailed
description of XML, I recommend Hunter et al. [16].
I will use a simple example to describe the basics of XML. Let us say that a
library wants to store or communicate a list of books by using XML. Listing 3.1
shows how the library may express this list.
<lib:books xmlns:lib="http://library.com/">
<lib:book id="1">
<lib:isbn>1234-567-89-0</lib:isbn>
<lib:title>Cooking for Dummies</lib:title>
<lib:author>Donald Cook</lib:author>
<lib:publisher>John Wiley and Sons</lib:publisher>
</lib:book>
<lib:book id="2">
...
</lib:book>
...
</lib:book>
Listing 3.1: A list of books expressed using XML.
This example is quite self-explanatory, but I will go through the main concepts.
Each book is described using book elements with four sub-elements each. The
book elements also have an id attribute, specifying a unique book ID. Notice
that each element has a prefix named lib. This prefix denotes the namespace
of the elements [19], and is declared by the xmlns attribute of books. In this
case, the namespace is http://library.com.
One might ask what we need namespaces for. A namespace is a unique identifier
defined to help avoiding naming conflicts [20]. For instance, similar to the
library, a bookstore may also communicate its list of books using XML. The
bookstore uses a different set of sub-elements underneath the book element,
such as pricing information and number of books in stock. If the library and
the bookstore decides to merge their lists, there will be two different book
structures in the same document. Thus, we have a naming conflict, and need
a way to distinguish the two types of books from each other. In listing 3.1,
the prefix lib is used to indicate that the elements belong to the namespace
of the library. When adding books from the bookstore to the same document,
a new namespace may be defined in a similar way to distinguish between the
two types of books. As will be evident in the following sections, namespaces
play an important role when multiple XML-based standards are combined in
the same document.
In addition to namespaces, we need a way to define the structure of XML
documents. This is done using XML Schemas, which enable us to specify the
elements that may appear in the documents, and in what hierarchy they may
be used [20]. For instance, a book element should only appear as a sub-element
of books, and all book elements must have an id attribute. All XML-based
standards that are described in this chapter have their own XML Schema(s).
When a standard is being used, the Schema document(s) of this standard is
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specified inside the XML document. XML parsers are then able to check that
the XML document conforms to the XML Schema in question.
This has been a very brief introduction to XML. As mentioned, for those who
have limited knowledge of XML, I recommend Hunter et al. [16] for a more
in-depth description. In the rest of this report I will assume that the reader is
familiar with the basic concepts of XML.
3.2.2 Web Services Description Language (WSDL)
Web Service Description Language (WSDL) provides a model for describing
Web Services. A WSDL document uses abstractions such as messages, ports,
and services, which support a generic way of specifying the protocols and data
formats used by a Web Service [20]. WSDL documents have three layers of
description [19]:
• The portType layer describes the interface of a service. This consists
of the service operations, including input and output parameters. These
parameters are defined in message sections.
• The binding layer defines the protocol and format used by the Web Ser-
vice operations.
• The service layer defines the address where the Web Service is available.
Now, let us look at an example that shows what a WSDL document looks like.
A university wants to offer a Web Service that returns a student’s grade in a
given course. A student should invoke the service by supplying a course ID. In
return, the students grading for that specific course will be received. Listing 3.2
shows a WSDL document describing this Web Service. For simplicity, I have
omitted XML Schemas, types, and binding details from this example.
<wsdl:definitions name="CourseRegisterService"
xmlns:wsdl="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/"
xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/soap/">
<wsdl:types>
...
</wsdl:types>
<wsdl:message name="getGradeInput">
<wsdl:part name="courseId" type="xsd:string"/>
</wsdl:message>
<wsdl:message name="getGradeOutput">
<wsdl:part name="grade" type="xsd:string"/>
</wsdl:message>
<wsdl:portType name="CourseRegister">
<wsdl:operation name="getGrade">
<wsdl:input message="tns:getGradeInput" />
<wsdl:output message="tns:getGradeOutput" />
</wsdl:operation>
</wsdl:portType>
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<wsdl:binding name="CourseRegisterSoapBinding" ...>
...
</wsdl:binding>
<wsdl:service name="CourseRegisterService">
<wsdl:port name="CourseRegisterPort"
binding="tns:CourseRegisterSoapBinding">
<soap:address location="http://rodem.no:9090/courseregister"/>
</wsdl:port>
</wsdl:service>
</wsdl:definitions>
Listing 3.2: A WSDL document describing a service with one operation.
The WSDL document in listing 3.2 contains one operation, getGrade, as seen
from the portType section. When invoked, this operation receives a course ID,
and responds with a grade associated with the course in question. The service
section specifies the location of the service.
A WSDL document can be hand-coded, but often, it is more convenient to
generate these documents using a tool [20]. This is especially useful if we have
an existing application and want to make its interfaces available through a Web
Service.
3.2.3 Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP)
SOAP is the protocol that is used for exchanging messages with Web Services.
While HTTP is typically the low-level protocol used for interaction, SOAP is
the specific format for exchanging messages over HTTP [19]. A SOAP message
is an XML document consisting of an envelope with a header and a body.
Listing 3.3 shows the structure of SOAP messages.
<soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
<soap:Header>
...
</soap:Header>
<soap:Body>
...
</soap:Body>
</soap:Envelope>
Listing 3.3: The structure of SOAP messages.
The Body element contains the actual data of the message. There are no con-
straints on the content of this element, except that it cannot carry free text
by itself. In other words, the content should be XML elements only. The ac-
tual interpretation of the content of the Body element is up to the application
receiving the message. [20]
The Header element may contain additional information about the message.
This element can contain extensions to SOAP and/or additional application
semantics. In addition to the Body and Header elements, a SOAP message
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may carry a SOAP Fault. This element can be found within the Body of the
message, and communicates error information back to the consumer. [20]
Let us look at a simple example of message exchange using SOAP. Recall the
WSDL document shown in listing 3.2. A student would call this service, sup-
plying a course ID, to get his/her grade for that specific course. Listing 3.4
shows such a call.
<soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
<soap:Header>
...
</soap:Header>
<soap:Body>
<courseId>TDT4520</courseId>
</soap:Body>
</soap:Envelope>
Listing 3.4: A SOAP request asking for a grade in course TDT4520.
As can be seen from listing 3.4, the Body of the SOAP message contains the
input data to the operation, in this case a course ID. For simplicity I have
excluded all Header elements in this example. Now, let us look at a SOAP
response to this call.
<soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
<soap:Header>
...
</soap:Header>
<soap:Body>
<grade>C</grade>
</soap:Body>
</soap:Envelope>
Listing 3.5: A SOAP response returning a grade to the consumer.
The response in listing 3.5 is structured in the same way as the request. The
Body contains the grade for the course in question. In this case the student
apparently got a C.
This and the previous sections have introduced some of the fundamental stan-
dards used by Web Services. The simple examples in these sections show how
services can be described, and how messages can be exchanged. However, I
have still not mentioned anything about the security of these concepts. How
can a consumer prove his or her identity, and how can messages be encrypted?
I will answer these and more security related questions in the next section.
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3.3 Security Standards
This section aims to introduce the reader to some of the most important security
standards for XML and Web Services, and to show examples of their use. The
number of security standards can be overwhelming, and because of this, I will
begin by showing an overview of the standards and their area of application.
The standards that I will present in this section cover five functional aspects of
security:
• Authentication - Verifying the identity of users [20].
• Authorization - Deciding whether or not to permit an action on a resource
[20].
• Confidentiality - Protecting secrecy of sensitive data [20].
• Integrity - Detecting data tampering [20].
• Non-repudiation - Preventing either the sender or the receiver from deny-
ing a transmitted message [40].
Figure 3.3 shows the main XML and Web Services security standards, and
relates them to functional aspects of security.
Figure 3.3: Security standards related to XML and Web Services.
There are a few things to note from this figure. For instance, WS-Security may
be used in all cases. This does not mean that WS-Security is able to cover all
of our needs. As we will see in the following sections, WS-Security provides
the syntax and semantics for using other XML-based security standards in
SOAP messages. In addition, we see that transport-level security (SSL/TLS)
may be used for authentication, integrity, and confidentiality. As mentioned
in section 2.4, however, transport-level security may not be appropriate in a
complex SOA. In such cases, XML Encryption and XML Signature can be used
as an alternative. Lastly, we see that a standard called SAML may be used
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for authentication and authorization. WS-Security, XML Encryption, XML
Signature, and SAML are described in the following sections.
Before diving into the standards, I will briefly mention the standardization
organizations involved in the security of XML and Web Services. XML, WSDL,
and SOAP have been developed by W3C. When it comes to Web Services
security standards, however, W3C is joined by OASIS. W3C is the development
base for XML Encryption and XML Signature, while OASIS is the development
base for WS-Security and SAML. [27]
In relation to standards, WS-I should also be mentioned. WS-I (The Web
Services Interoperability Organization) is an industry consortium that seeks
to enhance interoperability among Web Services implementations [20]. WS-I
publishes implementation guidelines known as profiles for popular Web Services
standards to promote interoperability. WS-I has published a Basic Security
Profile [29] that clarifies WS-Security and associated token profiles.
When choosing a vendor or open source solution for Web Services security,
higher value should be placed on WS-I compliance than on simple conformance
to standards [27]. Two implementations that both claim WS-Security compli-
ance may not be interoperable, as they might implement different portions of
WS-Security. On the other hand, two implementations that both claim WS-I
compliance will be interoperable [27].
3.3.1 WS-Security
In section 3.2.3, examples of message exchange using SOAP were presented.
However, nothing was said about the security of these messages. One might
think that security information such as usernames and passwords are added
to the body of messages just as any other information. While this is possible,
it has a major drawback. The interpretation of the SOAP body is up to the
service receiving the message [20]. The SOAP body is processed as part of the
business operations of the service. This means that security would have to be
handled as part of business operations, and that security information would be
expressed in different ways by different services. We want to express security
information in a standardized way that can be understood by all consumers
and services. This is where the WS-Security standard comes into play.
WS-Security defines a SOAP header element, named Security, for making
security claims and ensuring message-level security [20]. Security claims are
statements that are made regarding security. These claims may state things
like the users identity, who signed the message or what key was used for en-
cryption of the message. Multiple security claims may be added to the same
message. Listing 3.6 shows a simplified SOAP message that uses WS-Security
for specifying a username and password.
<soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
<soap:Header>
<wsse:Security xmlns:wsse="../oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd">
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<wsse:UsernameToken ...>
<wsse:Username>magrode</wsse:Username>
<wsse:Password>password</wsse:Password>
</wsse:UsernameToken>
</wsse:Security>
</soap:Header>
<soap:Body>
...
</soap:Body>
</soap:Envelope>
Listing 3.6: A SOAP message containing a WS-Security header with a username and
a password.
In this example, the Security header element contains a UsernameToken.
A UsernameToken carries the claim that a message is sent from a particu-
lar user [20]. In this case, the username and password are sent in clear text.
UsernameToken is only one of many types of security tokens that can be added
to the Security header. Examples include public key certificates2 and SAML
assertions [20].
While WS-Security supports security tokens that make security claims, it does
not specify how security claims are verified, what keys and algorithms to use
for encryption and signing, and how requests are authorized. WS-Security only
provides the syntactic and semantic support needed to implement any security
model in the context of Web Services [20].
3.3.2 XML Encryption
Currently, Secure Sockets Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS) is com-
monly used for secure communication over the Internet [40]. While SSL/TLS is
a very secure and reliable protocol for providing end-to-end security between two
parties [36], it has some shortcomings with respect to complex service-oriented
architectures. SSL/TLS encrypts the communication channel, but this may
not be enough, as described in section 2.4. When a message travels through
untrusted intermediary nodes on the path to its destination, we need to be able
to encrypt parts of messages to prevent the intermediary nodes from reading
sensitive data [20].
The XML Encryption standard allows parts of a SOAP message to be en-
crypted. XML Encryption is not intended to replace or supersede SSL/TLS,
but rather provide mechanisms that are not covered by SSL/TLS [36]. With
XML Encryption, both secure and non-secure data can be exchanged in the
same document, and confidentiality can be ensured on the entire path between
the sender and destination endpoints [20]. Another advantage of XML En-
cryption is that it provides persistent encryption, as encrypted documents can
2A public key certificate consists of a public key plus an identifier of the key owner, with
the whole block signed by a trusted third party [40].
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be stored. XML Encryption is tied to SOAP using WS-Security, and operates
at the message level, which means that it is independent of the underlying
transport [27].
To be able to understand the examples in this and the next section, the reader
should know the basics of public key cryptography. With public key cryptogra-
phy, a user has two keys. One key is private, while the other key is public. The
keys are mathematically related, but it is not possible to derive one key from
another [40]. These keys can be used for encryption. Figure 3.4 illustrates the
use of public and private keys for encryption.
Figure 3.4: If Alice wants to send a message to Bob, she can encrypt the message using
Bob’s public key. When receiving the message, Bob can decrypt it with his private key.
Nobody other than Bob is able to decrypt the message, as Bob is the only one who has
the private key.
In the following example, I will show how XML Encryption is used together with
WS-Security. Recall the SOAP message in listing 3.6. In this SOAP message,
a username and password were transmitted in clear text. Let us say that we
would like to encrypt the UsernameToken but keep the body of the message in
clear text. Listing 3.7 shows a very simplified example of this.
<soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
<soap:Header>
<wsse:Security xmlns:wsse="../oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd">
<xenc:EncryptedKey xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#">
...
</xenc:EncryptedKey>
<xenc:EncryptedData ...>
...
</xenc:EnctyptedData>
</wsse:Security>
</soap:Header>
<soap:Body>
...
</soap:Body>
</soap:Envelope>
Listing 3.7: A SOAP message containing a WS-Security header with an encrypted
username and password.
As can be seen from listing 3.7, the UsernameToken has been replaced by two
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other elements, namely EncryptedKey3 and EncryptedData:
• EncryptedKey contains information about the key that was used for en-
cryption. This is provided to help the recipient in decryption of the mes-
sage. This information includes the algorithm used for encrypting the
key, the key used for encrypting the key, the actual encrypted key and a
reference list that indicates which elements of the message that have been
encrypted using the key. [20]
• EncryptedData contains the actual encrypted data, which in this case is
a UsernameToken. In addition, this element contains a reference to the
encrypted key that was used for encrypting the data, and the algorithm
used for encryption. [20]
3.3.3 XML Signature
The integrity of data can be ensured using SSL/TLS [48]. However, as this
operates on the transport-level, we cannot rely on SSL/TLS when messages
travel through untrusted intermediary nodes. In such cases, we need to use
digital signatures for protecting the integrity of messages. A digital signature is
analogous to a handwritten signature, and verifies the author and the contents
of a message [40]. Not only does this protect the integrity of messages, but as
both the author and contents are verified, the author cannot repudiate that a
message exchange has taken place.
Signing of messages is performed by computing a message digest and securely
communicating this digest together with the message to the receiver. The
receiver can then recompute the digest and compare this digest with the one
provided by the sender [20]. Public key cryptography is commonly used for
communicating digests in a secure manner. The sender encrypts the digest with
his or her private key, and the receiver uses the sender’s public key to decrypt
the digest. Undetected modification of both the message and the encrypted
message digest is not possible without knowing the private key that was used
for encryption [20].
Let us say that Alice wants to send a message to Bob. Alice wants Bob to be
able to verify that the message has not been tampered with. To do this, Alice
needs to compute a digest of the message, and communicate this digest securely
to Bob along with the actual message. Bob uses Alice’s public key to decrypt
the encrypted digest and recomputes the digest of the message. Then, Bob
compares the two digests to verify that they are equal. Figure 3.5 illustrates
the signing and verification process between Alice and Bob.
3Public key cryptography is computationally expensive [40]. Because of this, we do not
want to encrypt large chunks of data using this scheme. Instead, a randomly chosen symmetric
key is encrypted using public key cryptography and sent to the receiving party [20]. It is this
symmetric key that is used for encryption and decryption of data. With symmetric encryp-
tion, the same key is used both for encryption and decryption, which is less computationally
expensive [40].
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Figure 3.5: Alice computes a message digest of the message to Bob, and encrypts the
digest using her private key. The encrypted digest is added to the message and sent
to Bob. Bob recomputes the digest of the message, and uses Alice’s public key to
decrypt the digest that was contained in the message. If the two digests match, then
the message has not been tampered with.
XML Signature is a standard that allows a digital signature to be expressed
using XML. Similar to XML Encryption, XML Signature is bound to SOAP
using WS-Security. The XML Signature structure is placed inside the Security
element of the SOAP header. Listing 3.8 shows a simplified SOAP message
where the body of the message has been signed.
<soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
<soap:Header>
<wsse:Security xmlns:wsse="../oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd">
<wsse:BinarySecurityToken wsu:Id="CertId-338156" ValueType="...#X509v3">
...
</wsse:BinarySecurityToken>
<ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
<ds:SignedInfo ...>
<ds:Reference URI="#id-13033964">
...
<ds:DigestValue ...>
6429WQ5aLlydSX9COCHdChqgttY=
</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
...
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</ds:SignedInfo>
<ds:SignatureValue ...>
...
</ds:SignatureValue>
<ds:KeyInfo ...>
<wsse:SecurityTokenReference ...>
<wsse:Reference URI="#CertId-338156" />
</wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
</ds:KeyInfo>
</ds:Signature>
</wsse:Security>
</soap:Header>
<soap:Body wsu:Id="id-13033964">
...
</soap:Body>
</soap:Envelope>
Listing 3.8: A SOAP message containing a WS-Security header with a signature.
This example might be a bit complex, but I will try to explain the different
elements and how they relate to each other. The Signature element has three
sub-elements:
• SignedInfo is the element that is actually signed [20]. This element
contains the digest value of the SOAP body. We can see that SignedInfo
refers to the Id of the SOAP body in the URI attribute.
• SignatureValue contains the value of the signature [20]. The signature
is an encrypted digest of what is signed (SignedInfo).
• KeyInfo contains information about the key that can be used for verifying
the signature [20]. In this case, we simply refer to a BinarySecurityToken
by specifying its Id as the value of the URI attribute.
The BinarySecurityToken contains the public key certificate of the sender [20].
If the issuer of this certificate is trusted by the receiver, and the encrypted and
recomputed digests match, the receiver can be certain that the message is intact
and originates from the subject in question [40].
3.3.4 Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)
I have already provided an example of authentication using usernames and pass-
words in WS-Security. By adding a UsernameToken to the Security header,
usernames and passwords can be provided for authentication with a service.
Now imagine that multiple services exist in a SOA, and that each service wants
to authenticate and authorize its consumers. It is still possible to supply user-
names and passwords when calling each service, but as more and more services
are added to the architecture, authentication and authorization in each service
might become difficult to manage. A subtle change in the user database(s)
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or new requirements for methods of authentication might lead to changes in
multiple services.
To address the challenge of deploying, managing, and evolving security en-
forcement mechanisms across a large number of services, Kanneganti and Cho-
davarapu [20] suggest using a dedicated security service for authentication and
authorization. They argue that a security service can be centrally managed and
quickly modified to meet rapidly changing business needs. Figure 3.6 illustrates
this concept.
Figure 3.6: Before using regular services, the consumer sends security credentials to a
security service that performs authentication and authorization. The security service
returns some information back to the consumer. The consumer can use this information
to prove his or her identity and authorizations when invoking other services.
As illustrated in figure 3.6, the security service returns some information that
the consumer can use for proving his or her identity and authorizations when in-
voking other services. This information can be expressed using SAML (Security
Assertion Markup Language) [20].
SAML is an XML-based language for management and exchange of security
information between different systems [19]. Using SAML, one party can assert
security information about a subject. This subject can for example be a user,
system or company. In addition to the identity of the subject, other attributes
such as permissions and email addresses can also be asserted [15]. Security in-
formation about a subject is communicated using SAML assertions. Listing 3.9
shows an example of such an assertion.
<saml:Assertion xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:assertion"
AssertionID="_42da98fa7244b6ecba8c17f4cebd70c9"
IssueInstant="2008-05-19T08:40:22.414Z"
Issuer="http://rodem.no/securityservice/"
MajorVersion="1" MinorVersion="1">
<saml:AuthenticationStatement
AuthenticationInstant="2008-05-19T08:40:22.363Z"
AuthenticationMethod="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:am:password">
<saml:Subject>
<saml:NameIdentifier NameQualifier="rodem.no">
magrode
</saml:NameIdentifier>
</saml:Subject>
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...
</saml:AuthenticationStatement>
</saml:Assertion>
Listing 3.9: A SAML assertion containing an AuthenticationStatement.
The assertion in listing 3.9 contains an AuthenticationStatement, indicating
that the user magrode has been authenticated. The attribute values of the
Assertion element show the specific time when the assertion was issued, the
URI of the assertion issuer and SAML version that is being used. In addi-
tion, the AuthenticationMethod attribute indicates that a password was used
for authentication with the security service. The Assertion element may be
inserted into the WS-Security header in the same way as a UsernameToken.
Much more information can be added to SAML assertions. Refer to the OASIS
SAML Token Profile [15] for a more extensive description of assertions.
SAML assertions may be generated and exchanged using a variety of protocols
[26]. Examples are WS-Trust, which is briefly described in the next section, and
the SAML protocol. Both these standards propose a request-response protocol
for handling assertions. If only issuing, validating, renewing, and canceling
SAML assertions is required, the SAML protocol is much simpler than WS-
Trust [20].
The following simple example, inspired by Kanneganti and Chodavarapu [20],
illustrates a SOAP message querying a security service to see if a subject is
permitted to execute a resource.
<soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
<soap:Header>
<wsse:Security xmlns:wsse="../oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd">
...
</wsse:Security>
</soap:Header>
<soap:Body>
<samlp:Request xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:protocol">
<samlp:AuthorizationDecisionQuery>
<saml:Subject>
<saml:NameIdentifier NameQualifier="rodem.no">
magrode
</saml:NameIdentifier>
</saml:Subject>
</samlp:AuthorizationDecisionQuery>
</samlp:Request>
</soap:Body>
</soap:Envelope>
Listing 3.10: Example of a request using the SAML protocol over SOAP. This example
was inspired by Kanneganti and Chodavarapu [20].
The request in listing 3.10 contains an AuthorizationDecisionQuery, asking
for authorization details for the user magrode. The consumer of the security
service submits his credentials using the WS-Security header entry. The security
service responds with the following SOAP message.
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<soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
<soap:Header>
...
</soap:Header>
<soap:Body>
<samlp:Response xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:protocol">
<samlp:Status>
<samlp:StatusCode Value="samlp:Success"/>
</samlp:Status>
<saml:Assertion xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:assertion">
<saml:AuthorizationDecisionStatement
Resource="http://rodem.no/someservice/someOperation"
Decision="Permit">
<saml:Subject>
<saml:NameIdentifier NameQualifier="rodem.no">
magrode
</saml:NameIdentifier>
</saml:Subject>
<saml:Action>
Execute
</saml:Action>
</saml:AuthorizationDecisionQuery>
</saml:Assertion>
</samlp:Request>
</soap:Body>
</soap:Envelope>
Listing 3.11: Example of a response from a security service that supports the SAML
protocol. This example was inspired by Kanneganti and Chodavarapu [20].
Listing 3.11 shows that the security service responds with a StatusCode indi-
cating whether the request succeeded or failed. The actual Assertion states
that the user magrode is permitted to execute the specific resource. Refer to the
SAML specification [26] for a more thorough description of the SAML protocol.
3.3.5 Other Security Standards
In addition to the standards already described in this chapter, some other im-
portant Web Services standards related to security deserves to be mentioned:
• WS-Trust
Enables issuing, renewal, and validation of security tokens. WS-Trust
describes a security token service (STS) that issues security tokens. The
interface for the STS is designed to meet the requirements of a wide
variety of situations, and supports multiple types of security tokens such
as SAML assertions, Kerberos tickets or keys. [20]
• WS-SecureConversation
Provides for the establishment and maintenance of a security context
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across different messages in a conversation. The advantage of this is that
keys used for encryption/decryption and signing/verification need to be
exchanged only once for each conversation between a consumer and a
service. [20]
• WS-Policy and WS-SecurityPolicy
Provides a comprehensive framework for promoting interoperability among
Web Services implementations. WS-Policy provides the basic syntax for
expressing policies, which in this case are machine-readable expressions
of what is required in a message exchange. WS-SecurityPolicy provides
security-related policy assertions that can be used in WS-Policy docu-
ments. These assertions can for example state that all messages sent to
the service must contain a username and password, or be encrypted using
a specific algorithm [20].
• WS-Addressing
Not exactly a security standard, but may be used for routing messages
through intermediaries. This can be useful when a security service is
used as an intermediary for performing authentication/authorization or
validating data. WS-Addressing preserves addressing information of mes-
sages, which means that an intermediary security service is able to deter-
mine where a message should go next after having processed it. [20].
3.4 Summary
This chapter has defined what Web Services are, and described the standards
used by such services. Web Services are the most popular way of implementing
SOA, and makes extensive use of XML-based standards for communication.
Fundamental Web Service standards such as XML, WSDL, and SOAP were
described in section 3.2. XML plays a major part in Web Services, as it is the
common denominator format for data exchange. WSDL is used for describing
the interface of a Web Service, and SOAP is used for exchanging messages over
a lower-level transport such as HTTP.
The main security standards related to XML and Web Services were described
in section 3.3. WS-Security defines a SOAP header for making security claims
and ensuring message-level security. Other standards such as XML Encryption,
XML Signature, and SAML make use of this header for adding security infor-
mation to to SOAP messages. XML Encryption enables encryption of parts of
SOAP messages, and XML Signature allows a digital signature to be expressed
using XML. Finally, SAML enables management and exchange of security in-
formation between different systems. SAML may be used when having a central
security service for authentication and authorization.
Now that the basics of SOA and Web Services have been presented, we can
move on to describing security threats and countermeasures that are relevant
for SOA.
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Chapter 4
Threats and Countermeasures
This chapter describes threats and countermeasures that may apply to SOA.
Before diving into this material, let us clearly define the meaning of these these
concepts. According to McGraw [28] a threat, within information security, is
the danger posed by a malicious agent for a variety of motivations. For a threat
to be effective, it must act against a vulnerability in the system. A vulner-
ability is a defect or weakness in the system that can be used to break the
systems security or violate security policy [28]. Following this, a countermea-
sure is a way of protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the
system and its information [28]. Threats, vulnerabilities and countermeasures
are closely related terms. A countermeasure can remove one or more threats,
thus preventing the exploitation of one or more vulnerabilities.
For each threat presented in this chapter, I will describe countermeasures that
can be applied. While this chapter describes the most common threats and
countermeasures in relation to SOA, there is no hiding the fact that other issues
may exist, and new issues will arise over time. Because of this, it is crucial that
SOA developers stay up to date on the latest security issues. Good sources of
information include mailing lists such as Bugtraq [34], CERTs1, and of course
articles and books.
4.1 SQL Injection
Services may use SQL (Structured Query Language) for communication with
one or more databases. Some services might also build SQL queries based on
input from external sources. In such cases, developers need to be aware of the
dangers of SQL injection.
The principle of SQL injection is best described using an example. Consider a
service that accepts an ISBN as input and returns a description of the corre-
1Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERT) assemble, process and provide information
about vulnerabilities [33]. CERTs regularly publish advisories containing warnings about
severe vulnerabilities, and also observe areas such as viruses and Trojan horses.
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sponding book back to the consumer. For example, the service might receive
the following call:
<bookInfo>
<isbn>9788204119896</isbn>
</bookInfo>
The service uses the following SQL query to retrieve information about books:
SELECT * FROM book WHERE isbn = ’" + isbn + "’;
This query will cause no problems as long as the input actually is an ISBN.
However, consider the following call:
<bookInfo>
<isbn>
0’;
DELETE FROM book;
</isbn>
</bookInfo>
This results in the following SQL statements:
SELECT * FROM book WHERE isbn = ’0’;
DELETE FROM book;
The consumer was able to inject additional SQL code into the original query, in
this case deleting all entries in the table. As illustrated by this example, an SQL
injection vulnerability might leave the entire database exposed and writable to
an attacker.
How can we avoid these types of attacks? The main countermeasure to SQL
injection is to ensure that received data does not contain SQL metacharacters
[17]. There are multiple ways of performing data validation. When filtering
data, the recommended approach is to use whitelisting instead of blacklisting2.
Besides filtering, another way of dealing with metacharacters is to use prepared
statements, in which query parameters are passed separately from the SQL
statement. Finally, an important countermeasure to these types of threats is
to not reveal too much details regarding the implementation of the service in
error messages. A potential attacker will most likely send various types of data
to the service, trying to find out more about how the service is implemented.
Thus, error messages or SOAP Faults should not be too verbose.
4.2 XPath Injection
Services that process XML documents using XPath might be vulnerable to
XPath injection. XPath injection is based on the same principle as SQL injec-
tion, but in this case it is XPath metacharacters that might cause problems.
2Blacklisting means looking for bad data and blocking such data if found. When performing
whitelisting however, we state the type of data that is considered harmless and block the rest.
Whitelisting is preferred in a security context as it also blocks unknown types of data [17].
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As almost all implementations of SOA involve a lot of XML processing [20],
XPath injections are especially relevant for SOA.
Let us look at an example, inspired by Robi [35], that illustrates this type of
threat. A service performs authentication by comparing credentials supplied
by a consumer with user information stored in an XML document. This XML
document contains user entries on the following form:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<users>
<user>
<firstname>Magne</firstname>
<lastname>Rodem</lastname>
<loginID>magrode</loginID>
<password>password</password>
</user>
...
</users>
When receiving a message from a consumer, the service extracts a username and
password of the consumer. When using SOAP and WS-Security, the message
header might look like this:
<soap:Header>
<wsse:Security xmlns:wsse="...">
<wsse:UsernameToken>
<wsse:Username>magrode</wsse:Username>
<wsse:Password>password</wsse:Password>
</wsse:UsernameToken>
</wsse:Security>
</soap:Header>
Before the service processes the body of this message, it uses the following
XPath statement to locate the user in question:
//users/user[loginID/text()=’" + username + "’ and
password/text()=’" + password + "’]
This statement goes through the entire XML document looking for user en-
tries that have the desired loginID and password. If the service receives the
username and password as shown in the header above, this will work with-
out problems. The user information is found and access is granted. However,
consider the following username and password:
<wsse:Username>’ or 1=1</wsse:Username>
<wsse:Password>’ or 1=1</wsse:Password>
This will result in an XPath statement that looks a little different than what
was originally intended:
//users/user[loginID/text()=’’ or 1=1 and password/text()=’’ or 1=1]
Now, every user entry in the XML document will be returned as this statement
will be true for all users (1=1). The user is then granted access as one or more
corresponding user entries were found in the XML document.
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Depending on the implementation, this type of attack yields a lot of possibilities
for persons of malicious intent. If XPath is used in the retrieval of static data,
the attacker might be able to read the entire XML document. Similarly, if an
XSL transformation3 is performed somewhere after reading data from external
sources, an attacker could inject XPath statements to modify the data during
transformation.
As with SQL injection, the main countermeasure to this type of attack is to
ensure that received data does not contain metacharacters [35]. For data val-
idation the same principles as for SQL injection (section 4.1) holds. XPath
does not support the concept of parametrized queries, but similar functionality
can be achieved by using other APIs such as XQuery. Refer to Robi [35] for
an example of parametrized queries with XQuery. As always, error messages
and SOAP Faults should be kept as brief as possible to not reveal too much
implementation details of the service.
4.3 Buffer Overflow Attacks
The threat of buffer overflow attacks in SOA is very much the same as for other
distributed software systems. In 2000, buffer overflows accounted for almost
45% of all security problems reported to CERT [47], and it is probably still the
most commonly exploited vulnerability today [20].
In lower-level languages such as C and C++, memory handling is left to the
developers. If a developer wants to use a part of the memory, he or she has
to allocate a certain amount of bytes manually. When writing to memory, the
size of the written data might be larger than the size of the allocated buffer.
In such cases, data will be written outside the buffer, which might have serious
consequences. For a more in-depth description of buffer overflow problems, refer
to Wagner et al. [47].
If a service does not make sure that the size of received data fits in its allo-
cated buffers, it may be vulnerable to buffer overflow attacks. For example,
by sending more data than the service expects, an attacker might be able to
execute arbitrary code. In addition, buffer overflow vulnerabilities can exist in
underlying APIs or in the web/application server hosting the service.
While buffer overflow attacks are generally a significant threat, distributed sys-
tems such as SOA has an advantage over traditional applications. Similar to
web applications [12], services benefit from the fact that an attacker is not able
to analyze the application source code or binaries. It is much more difficult to
perform a buffer overflow attack without knowledge of the service implementa-
tion.
The main countermeasure to buffer overflow attacks is data validation. Care
should be taken to ensure that received data fits in its designated buffers. As
3eXtensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) is used for transforming XML documents into other
XML documents [9].
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buffer overflow problems can be exploited on the system level (i.e. starting new
processes or accessing the file system), it is important not to give the service
application more privileges than it really needs [20]. The user account running
the service process should for instance not have administrative privileges. On
UNIX, an additional way of limiting the damage is to run the service in a
chroot jail4.
The best way of countering the threat of buffer overflow attacks is however to
build services using type-safe languages such as Java and C#. These languages
do not suffer from this problem [28].
4.4 Entity Recursion Attacks
Almost all SOA implementations involve a lot of XML processing [20], and
XML brings some new types of potential vulnerabilities. One type of threat
that is specific to XML-based services is entity recursion attacks, also known
as XML bombs.
XML supports declaration of entities within a Document Type Definition (DTD).
Entities are much similar to constants in a program. An entity can be defined
in the following way:
<!ENTITY entityName "entityValue">
This entity can then be referenced in the XML document as &entityName;.
Consider the following DTD, adopted from Gallagher [13]:
<!ENTITY x0 "Foobar">
<!ENTITY x1 "&x0;&x0;">
<!ENTITY x2 "&x1;&x1;">
<!ENTITY x3 "&x2;&x2;">
<!ENTITY x4 "&x3;&x3;">
...
<!ENTITY x100 "&x99;&x99;">
If &x100; is used somewhere in the XML document, it will first be replaced
by &x99;&x99;, which is further replaced by &x98;&x98;&x98;&x98; and so
on. This replacement chain continues until the replacement string eventually
becomes ”Foobar” repeated 2100 times. An attacker can easily generate the
DTD listed above, but the service receiving and processing the XML document
will eventually run out of memory. This type of attack may result in denial of
service (DoS), making the service unavailable for legitimate users.
Web Services using SOAP are vulnerable to this type of attack if the SOAP
implementation allows DTD within a SOAP message. The SOAP specification
prohibits the presence of DTD in a SOAP message [20]. Regardless of this,
many vendors (including IBM and Microsoft) have previously overlooked the
4The chroot system call is used to change the root of the file system as seen by the calling
process [10]. A process running in a chroot jail will not be able to access files outside the new
root directory.
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SOAP specifications and processed DTD anyway [30]. This goes to show that
one should not blindly trust SOAP vendors in these cases.
The most important countermeasure to entity recursion attacks is to make sure
that the SOAP implementation is compliant with the SOAP specification, and
thus do not accept DTD within a SOAP message.
4.5 External Entity Attacks
As described in the previous section, XML supports declaration of entities
within a Document Type Definition (DTD). In that section I also described
a type of attack that exploits this feature, namely entity recursion attacks.
Another type of attack that is related to entities are external entity attacks.
Almost all XML parsers allow plugging in an external entity resolver that can
resolve external entity references [20]. If an external entity resolver simply
resolves any external reference, this leads to new vulnerabilities. The following
shows an example, adopted from Gallagher [13], that contains an external entity
resolving the system file /etc/passwd.
<!DOCTYPE myTest [
<!ELEMENT foobar ANY>
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "/etc/passwd">
]>
<foobar>&xxe;</foobar>
If this code is allowed somewhere in a SOAP message, the contents of /etc/-
passwd is effectively added to the message. This may have all sorts of conse-
quences. If, for example the service echoes the message, an attacker will be able
to read the system password file.
An attacker could also use this feature to launch a DDoS attack (see section 4.7).
This could be done by simultaneously sending multiple SOAP messages to dif-
ferent services, resolving one specific URI. In addition, this could be exploited
by repeatedly accessing a limited system resource such as /dev/random5 [20].
Similar to entity recursion attacks, external entity attacks can only be executed
if the SOAP implementation allows DTD within a SOAP message. If entity
resolving functionality is required by the service, the external entity resolver
should be limited to only resolve a limited set of known locations.
The best way to counter external entity attacks however, is to make sure that
the SOAP implementation is compliant with the SOAP specification, and thus
do not accept DTD within a SOAP message.
5/dev/random is a random number generator on UNIX based systems that can degrade
performance of the system if used very frequently. [20]
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4.6 Service Description Scanning Attacks
Operations and invocation patterns of a service are specified in a service de-
scription. As seen in section 3.2.2, WSDL documents are used to describe Web
Services. While such documents are helpful for consumers that need to invoke
operations on the service, they also may contain debugging functions or expose
operations that were never meant to be called externally [1]. An attacker may
use this information to identify implementation details and possible weaknesses
of the service.
One obvious countermeasure to this type of attack is to ensure that service
descriptions do not contain more information than necessary. Web Services
frameworks support automatic generation of WSDL documents from source
code [20]. It is important to check that generated WSDL documents do not
contain debugging functions or other unnecessary information.
Some attackers might try to search for service descriptions using Google or
other search engines. By adding filetype:wsdl to a Google search query,
an attacker can easily find a lot of WSDL documents [1]. Further, these
documents can be scanned to find debugging functions and other interesting
information. To avoid having the WSDL document show up in a Google
filetype query, the WSDL document can be published in a more subtle
way. For instance, services may make WSDL documents available on the form
http://example.com/ServiceName?WSDL.
In some cases it can be necessary to only allow WSDL access to authenticated
consumers. The exact implementation of this depends on how the WSDL doc-
ument is published. For example, if the document is published as a file on a
web server, HTTP authentication or SSL client certificates may be used.
4.7 Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Attacks
When performing a denial of service (DoS) attack, an attacker tries to reduce the
availability of a service, thus attempting to stop legitimate users from operating
the service. Some ways of doing this in a SOA are based on entity recursion
attacks and external entity attacks as described in previous sections. However,
there is another form of DoS attack that might be more difficult to counter,
namely the distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack.
In a DDoS attack, services are hit with a flood of concurrent requests from
multiple points in the network [20]. When hit by a powerful DDoS attack, a
service would most likely crumble when trying to process all requests.
To cope with DDoS attacks, one needs to be able to quickly distinguish between
legitimate and bad requests. This should be done as early as possible, and at
multiple access points to the network [20]. Every access point to the network
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should use a firewall to filter good traffic from bad. Figure 4.1, adopted from
Kanneganti and Chodavarapu [20] illustrates this strategy.
Figure 4.1: A strategy for coping with DDoS attacks. By filtering traffic generated by
DoS attackers early and at multiple access points, DDoS attack on the service can be
avoided. Adopted from Kanneganti and Chodavarapu [20].
In figure 4.1, multiple attackers send a flood of requests to the service. The
service can be reached through two separate networks, which means that the
access points of each network need to be equipped with firewalls so that every
service request is filtered. This ensures that the service is able to process genuine
requests without being affected by the many DoS attacks. Another strategy for
handling DDoS attacks is to use load balancing for spreading the workload
between multiple servers [38]. Load balancing can mitigate DDoS attacks, as
multiple servers are able to handle more requests than just one single server.
Andrews and Whittaker [1] suggest using intrusion detection systems (IDS)
or bandwidth management solutions for detecting DDoS attacks. When an
unusual amount of activity are detected towards one host in the network, an
IDS can trigger firewall updates to block this activity. However, this may
be counterproductive. Attackers can launch attacks identifying themselves as
originating from legitimate users (e.g. large ISP proxies), thus blocking these
users from the service. Because of this, any countermeasure to DDoS attacks
should be carefully designed and reviewed [1].
4.8 Eavesdropping
If an attacker is located somewhere between a service and a consumer, he or
she might be able to eavesdrop on transmissions. In such cases, an attacker
would want to obtain information that is being sent. Two attacks related to
eavesdropping are traffic analysis and release of message contents [40].
Traffic analysis is performed by observing message patterns. This can be done
regardless of any encryption that may be used. By observing message patterns,
38
CHAPTER 4. THREATS AND COUNTERMEASURES 39
an attacker can determine the location and identity of communicating hosts, as
well as observing the frequency and length of messages being exchanged [40].
By gathering this information, the attacker can guess the nature of the com-
munication that is taking place.
In SOA, as in most cases where two parties are communicating, release of
message contents is countered using encryption. When a message is sent directly
between two parties, one common way of implementing confidentiality is to use
encryption on the transport layer, typically with SSL/TLS. In many cases,
this is also a good way of providing confidentiality in a SOA. However, when
intermediate services are involved in a transmission, one has to consider if these
intermediaries can be trusted. If this is not the case, SSL/TLS should not
be used - at least not as the only method for providing confidentiality - as
intermediaries will be able to read contents of messages.
When intermediaries cannot be trusted, confidentiality should be handled on the
message level rather than on the transport level. This means that the message
itself should be encrypted instead of solely relying on a secure connection such
as SSL/TLS [19]. How this is handled depends on the SOA implementation.
Currently the most prominent example is the WS-Security standard used by
Web Services. WS-Security and XML Encryption were described in section 3.3.
4.9 Tampering Data
It is a common misconception that message integrity is a side benefit that
is automatically achieved when using encryption. However, in reality an en-
crypted message may be subtly changed without impacting its ability to be
decrypted [27].
I have already described how SOA differs from traditional architectures when it
comes to confidentiality. When intermediate services are used in a transmission,
it is no longer sufficient to use a secure connection, such as SSL/TLS, between
endpoints. Intermediaries will be able to read the message contents, which may
not be desirable in all cases. This also affects how integrity is achieved in a
SOA.
Detecting that data has been tampered with can be done on the transport or
message level. Similar to confidentiality, integrity can be handled on the trans-
port level, often by using SSL/TLS, if no intermediate services are involved in
a transmission. However, when there are one or more untrusted intermediaries
between the two endpoints, integrity must be handled on the message level.
One way of countering data tampering on the message level is to use digital sig-
natures. When a message has been signed using the consumer’s private key, the
service can verify the integrity of the message by using the consumer’s public
key.
How this is done depends on the SOA implementation. A SOA built using Web
Services can benefit from the WS-Security standard and XML Signature. This
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was described in section 3.3.
4.10 Replay Attacks
One might assume that a message that has been properly encrypted and signed
cannot be used by an attacker. This is not true. Even though a message has
been encrypted and signed, it can still be used in a replay attack [27]. Replay
attacks are performed by capturing a valid message and resending it. Figure 4.2
shows how an attacker can perform a replay attack.
Figure 4.2: An attacker listening to the communication between a consumer and a
service can capture a message and resend it.
Replay attacks are often performed to gain unauthorized access. If an attacker
is able to capture a message that requests some kind of sensitive data from the
service, he or she may be able to resend the message along with the original
user’s security credentials. As the message contains legitimate security creden-
tials, the service will authorize the request and return the the sensitive data
back to the attacker.
This attack is relevant for any type of service. One countermeasure is to sign
some information that shows that the message actually was created by the con-
sumer in question at that specific time. This information can be a timestamp
or a nonce6 When using timestamps, a replayed message will include the same
timestamp as the original message [27]. The service will then be able to com-
pare the timestamp in a received message with its local time, and discard the
message if the timestamp has expired. It is important to carefully decide the
timestamp trust interval. An attacker should not have time to capture and
replay a message, yet the interval must be long enough to ensure that time dif-
ferences between hosts do not result in legitimate messages being blocked [27].
A practical way of countering this threat exists for Web Services. As mentioned
in section 3.3.3, SOAP messages can be signed using XML Signature. WS-
Security includes support for timestamps. A timestamp can be specified in the
SOAP header, below the WS-Security element:
<wsse:Security xmlns:wsse="..." xmlns:wsu="...">
...
<wsu:Timestamp wsu:Id="as820d72sj3">
<wsu:Created>2008-03-23T20:58:13Z"</wsu:Created>
6A nonce is an identifier or number that is used only once [40].
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<wsu:Expires>2008-03-23T21:00:13Z"</wsu:Created>
</wsu:Timestamp>
...
</wsse:Security>
Further, this timestamp can be signed using XML Signature by referring to the
timestamp Id:
<wsse:Security xmlns:wsse="..." xmlns:wsu="...">
...
<dsig:Signature xmlns:dsig="...">
<dsig:SignedInfo>
...
<dsig:Reference URI="#as820d72sj3">...</dsig:Reference>
</dsig:SignedInfo>
...
</dsig:Signature>
</wsse:Security>
The above example is very simplified, but shows the principle of signing times-
tamps using XML Signature. Now, let us say that an attacker was able to
capture a SOAP message containing the elements above. When the service
receives the copied message from the attacker, it will either recognize that the
message has already been received, or it will discover that the message has
expired [27].
Another way of countering replay attacks is to secure the transport layer using
SSL/TLS. SSL/TLS automatically protects against replay attacks by including
an implicit sequence number [48].
4.11 Repudiation
In cases where messages are exchanged, situations may arise where one of the
parties claim that a message has not been sent or received. If either the sender
or receiver of the message cannot prove that the message exchange has taken
place, they are vulnerable to repudiation attacks [40].
One common way of ensuring non-repudiation is to use public key cryptography
to sign all messages, and keep records of all message exchanges [42]. In practice,
this means that a sender signs outgoing messages with a private key, and then
the receiver can verify the signature using the public key of the sender.
The strategy for ensuring non-repudiation in a SOA is very much similar to
that of traditional system architectures [20]. Consumers and services may sign
and verify messages using public key cryptography. Because of this, I will not
go into detail on how to ensure non-repudiation. However, the actual imple-
mentation may vary. A SOA implemented using Web Services can make use
of WS-Security and XML Signature (both described in section 3.3) for signing
messages.
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4.12 Summary
In this chapter, I have presented threats and countermeasures that are relevant
for service-oriented architectures. Table 4.1 shows a summary of all threats and
their corresponding countermeasures.
Threat Countermeasures
SQL injection Perform data validation. Use prepared state-
ments.
XPath injection Perform data validation. Use XQuery to build
parametrized queries.
Buffer overflow attacks Perform data validation. Limit system privi-
leges. Use a type-safe language such as Java
or C#.
Entity recursion attacks Do not process DTD found within messages.
External entity attacks Do not process DTD found within messages.
Limit external entity resolving to known loca-
tions.
Service description scan-
ning attacks
Ensure that service descriptions does not con-
tain unnecessary information. Require authen-
tication when accessing descriptions. Hide de-
scriptions from search engines.
DDoS attacks Use firewalls to filter traffic. Use intrusion de-
tection systems to trigger firewall updates. Use
load balancing.
Eavesdropping Use a secure encrypted connection (SSL/TLS).
Encrypt the actual messages if untrusted inter-
mediaries are used.
Tampering data Use a secure encrypted connection (SSL/TLS).
Use digital signatures to sign messages if un-
trusted intermediaries are used.
Replay attacks Use a secure encrypted connection (SSL/TLS).
Sign timestamp or nonce.
Repudiation Sign all messages and keep records of all message
exchanges.
Table 4.1: Overview of threats and countermeasures.
As can be seen from this chapter, many of the threats that are present in
traditional systems are also relevant in SOA. SQL injection and buffer over-
flow attacks are common in web applications [1]. In addition, eavesdropping,
data tampering, DoS/DDoS, replay attack, and repudiation are well-known
threats in network security [40]. Even though many of the threats are present
in both traditional systems and SOA, some countermeasures differ. In specific,
SSL/TLS may no longer be enough for countering eavesdropping, data tamper-
ing, and replay attacks. Message-level security need to be used to counter these
threats when untrusted intermediaries are used.
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Some threats are more relevant in SOA than in traditional systems. Most
notably, service description scanning attacks are specific to SOA. XPath injec-
tion, entity recursion attacks, and external entity attacks exploit vulnerabilities
related to XML processing. As SOA involves a lot of XML processing [20],
these threats are especially relevant in SOA. Table 4.2 shows an overview of
the threats that are specific to SOA, have different countermeasures, or are
especially relevant in SOA compared to traditional systems.
Threat Specific Diff. count. Esp. rel.
SQL injection - - -
XPath injection - - X
Buffer overflow attacks - - -
Entity recursion attacks - - X
External entity attacks - - X
Service description scanning attacks X - -
DDoS attacks - - -
Eavesdropping - X -
Tampering data - X -
Replay attacks - X -
Repudiation - - -
Table 4.2: Overview of the threats that are specific to SOA, have different countermea-
sures in SOA, or are especially relevant in SOA compared to traditional systems.
Now that the security challenges, standards, threats, and countermeasures in
SOA have been presented, we are ready to identify some security guidelines for
development of SOA.
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Chapter 5
Security Guidelines
A guideline is a recommendation for things to do or to avoid [28]. In software
development, guidelines exist for specific technical contexts, such as web appli-
cations, distributed systems, database connectivity, and so on. Guidelines are
best enforced through human analysis, and should be kept in mind throughout
the entire software development process [28].
In this chapter, I will present high-level security guidelines for software devel-
opment. Some security guidelines should be followed regardless of the type of
system that is being built. I will briefly describe these guidelines in the next
section. In addition, I have provided a set of guidelines that are specific to
security in service-oriented architectures. These SOA-specific guidelines should
be applied during requirements analysis and design, and forms the basis of my
contribution in this thesis.
I will make practical use of the guidelines presented in this chapter when iden-
tifying requirements and designing a secure service-oriented architecture.
5.1 General Security Guidelines
In software development there are some security guidelines that always should
be kept in mind. Viega and McGraw [45] present 10 general design-level guide-
lines for developing secure software systems. I will quickly reiterate these guide-
lines here:
• GG1: Secure the weakest link
A system is only as secure as its weakest link. An attacker will always try
to attack the weakest part of a system, as this is what requires the least
amount of effort. Because of this, extra work should be done to improve
the security of the weakest part of a system.
• GG2: Practice defense in depth
A system that is built with defense in depth is more difficult to attack.
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The reason for this is that an attacker has to go through multiple defense
layers to succeed. Systems should not have a single point of failure.
• GG3: Fail securely
When a system fails, it should do so in a secure manner. In particular,
bad handling of unexpected errors may lead to security breaches. For
example, a system that prints too detailed error messages back to the
user might reveal sensitive information about the system or its data.
• GG4: Follow the principle of least privilege
Only the minimum access necessary to perform operations should be
given. In addition, access should be granted for a minimum amount of
time. This ensures that users are not able to do things other than what
was intended. Also, if an attacker is able to compromise a user account,
he or she will only be able to do minimal damage.
• GG5: Compartmentalize
A system should be broken into as many isolated units as possible. Then,
an attacker that has compromised one unit will only be able to take
advantage of that single unit. This can also increase the simplicity of
the system. An example of compartmentalization can be to use different
machines for different tasks.
• GG6: Keep it simple
By keeping a system as simple as possible, the code becomes easier to
maintain. Complex code is harder to review, and tend to have more
bugs [28]. Components should be reused when possible.
• GG7: Promote privacy
The privacy of users should naturally be ensured, but the privacy of sys-
tems must also be handled with care. A system might give away details
about themselves that can be used by an attacker. System information
that should be kept out of the hands of attackers include operating system
version, database structure, and file system details.
• GG8: Remember that hiding secrets is hard
Security by obscurity should not be relied upon. Hard coding secrets in
code or hiding passwords in clear text somewhere is bad practice. One
should always assume that attackers are able to see the source code or
reverse engineer binaries.
• GG9: Be reluctant to trust
Developers should assume that the environment where their system re-
sides is insecure. Trust can be given to external systems, code, people,
etc. In any case, trust should always be closely held and never loosely
given [7]. User input should not be trusted, and must be validated before
being used. Also, the security of a system can be increased by minimizing
the trust in other systems.
• GG10: Use community resources
It is good practice to use community resources instead of designing a
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home-brew security solution. Community resources are often tried and
tested, and developed by security experts. By using community resources
that are known to be secure, the likelihood of avoiding known mistakes
can be reduced.
5.2 SOA Security Guidelines
Service-oriented architectures are a bit different from traditional software sys-
tems. As described in previous chapters, this results in new approaches to
security. In this section, I will summarize the main security aspects of SOA,
and use this knowledge to create a set of guidelines that should be applied
during requirements engineering and design of service-oriented architectures.
These guidelines should be considered in addition to the 10 general guidelines
described in the previous section.
First, let us recap on the main security aspects of SOA that have been presented
in this report:
• Aspect 1: The interoperability concern
As mentioned in section 2.4, services should be kept as open and easy
to use as possible when choosing approaches for handling security. In
section 3.3, several security standards for SOA, or more specifically Web
Services, were presented. These standards are open and widely accepted,
and lead to standardized handling of security.
• Aspect 2: Different levels of security
In section 2.4, the problem with transport-level security and the use
of intermediaries were presented. Three threats in chapter 4, namely
eavesdropping, data tampering, and replay attacks, also mentioned this,
and message-level security was suggested as a countermeasure. However,
transport-level security has better performance, and is often more widely
supported [19].
• Aspect 3: Security may complicate business operations
Adding security information to the body of messages is bad practice, as
described in section 3.3.1. Then, security information would need to be
handled as part of the business logic, as the message body is processed
by business operations. Not only does this result in different ways of
expressing security information, but it also leads to increased complexity
of business operations.
• Aspect 4: Multiple entrances to applications
SOA leads to multiple entrances to applications, as functionality is made
available as services. As mentioned in section 2.4, this introduces new
challenges with respect to security functionality such as authentication
and authorization. SAML (described in section 3.3.4) helps in this re-
spect by enabling centralized authentication and authorization. A central
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security facility eases maintenance and allows for uniform handling of
security.
• Aspect 5: Keeping track of events can be difficult
As described in section 2.4, due to multiple entrances to applications,
logging and monitoring of a SOA is not as easy as in traditional systems.
When many services are involved it can be difficult to keep track of what
is going on, and what has happened. If we were able to log messages to
one central location, we would be better equipped to track issues in our
SOA [43].
When looking at this list of aspects, it becomes clear that certain recommen-
dations can be made for things to do, and things to avoid during requirements
engineering and design of a SOA. I will use this list of aspects as a basis for my
SOA security guidelines.
One could argue that I could have included more aspects in this list. For in-
stance, I have not mentioned the threats of service description scanning, XPath
injection, entity recursion, and external entity attacks, which were identified as
specific or especially relevant in chapter 4. However, service description scan-
ning is covered by the general guideline GG7, promote privacy. Thus, there is
no need to create a new guideline for this. The same goes for XPath injection,
which is covered by guideline GG10, be reluctant to trust. Entity recursion and
external entity attacks are mainly related to bad SOAP implementations. As
Web Services and SOAP are not the only way of implementing a SOA, I do
not want my guidelines to assume any specific implementation. My guidelines
should be on a high level, and entity recursion and external entity attacks are
a bit too specific to Web Services. Thus, I have not included these threats in
the above list of aspects.
As a result of my main findings in this report, which are summarized in the
above list of aspects, I propose the following five security guidelines for SOA:
• SG1: Retain interoperability when handling security
When handling security in a SOA, it is important to retain the philoso-
phy of keeping services as open and easy to use as possible. Interoper-
ability should not suffer because of security, and this means that open
and widely accepted security standards should be chosen when realizing
a service-oriented architecture. Examples of such standards are those de-
fined by OASIS and W3C. When building a SOA using Web Services,
one should especially focus on compliance with the WS-I Basic Security
Profile [29], which promotes interoperability between different implemen-
tations of standards.
• SG2: Assess the need for message-level security
Messages that are exchanged in a SOA might travel through untrusted
intermediary services. In such cases, transport-level security does not suf-
fice, as the untrusted intermediaries can eavesdrop on, or tamper with,
messages. To ensure confidentiality and integrity in these cases, encryp-
tion and signing of data should be handled on the message level [21].
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However, in more simple cases, where messages only travel between two
nodes or through trusted intermediaries, transport-level security might
be sufficient [20]. Transport-level security has better performance, and
is often more widely supported than message-level security [19]. When
developing a SOA, one should consider relevant requirements and threats
in detail, and decide whether or not message-level security is a necessity.
• SG3: Handle security outside of business operations
Separation of concerns is a core principle in SOA. This principle should not
only be applied at the architectural level, but also on the implementation
level [24]. This means that concerns such as security should be handled
outside of the business logic of the service. This reduces the complexity of
business operations, increases modifiability, and enables the possibility of
independent implementation of security by experts. An example of this
can be seen in Web Services using WS-Security, where security credentials
can be placed in the header of SOAP messages and checked before the
business operation is invoked.
• SG4: Centralize security
Multiple services often have similar security policies and mechanisms.
Security functionality such as authentication and authorization are com-
monly present in services. When dealing with a large number of services,
it can be hard to keep the security enforcements of all services consistent
and up to date. In such cases, security is best handled at a central loca-
tion. This can be done in several ways. Examples include using the same
user database for authentication in all services, adding an intermediary
facility for security processing between the consumers and the services, or
using a dedicated security service.
• SG5: Centralize logging
If an attacker is somehow able to cause harm to one or more services in
a SOA, an administrator should be able to detect and grasp the details
of the malicious event as quickly as possible. The distributed nature
of SOA leads to more entrances for an attacker as opposed to a large
single-entrance application [20]. If logs need to be manually gathered
from different services, this makes it more difficult to react in the case
of an attack. In addition, an attacker that has gained system privileges
might be able to tamper with logs that reside locally on the service host.
Because of this, logs should preferably be stored, not only locally, but also
centrally for easier monitoring and attack detection/recovery.
5.3 Summary
In this chapter I have presented a total of 15 guidelines for development of
secure service-oriented architectures. The ten guidelines that are identified by
Viega and McGraw [45] are applicable to all software systems. In addition to
these, I have composed a set of five guidelines specific to SOA.
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In the remaining chapters, I will describe development of a SOA and show
how the security threats described in chapter 4 can be countered using existing
standards and Java-based frameworks. During the development process I will
make use of the security guidelines presented in this chapter.
50
Chapter 6
Requirements Engineering
Previous chapters have described the theory behind SOA and security. In the
remaining of this report, I will look at a real-world case and demonstrate the
development of a SOA-based system. UNINETT FAS is one of many organi-
zations that are interested in SOA. They have provided me with a real-world
case scenario that will not only allow me to illustrate the security challenges in
SOA, but also to show how my guidelines can be applied in practice.
This chapter details requirements for a SOA-based system that imports per-
sonal data into multiple administrative systems. The chapter begins with a
brief introduction to the system, which includes background information and
a system overview. After the system has been introduced, some of the secu-
rity guidelines from chapter 5 are applied. Using these guidelines, I am able
to identify the services and functionality that are needed to fulfill the security
requirements of the system. Following this, the requirements of the services are
specified using use cases and misuse cases. The chapter ends with a summary
of the guidelines that have been used during requirements engineering.
6.1 System Introduction
This section describes UNINETT FAS and their requirements for a SOA-based
import mechanism.
6.1.1 Background
UNINETT FAS is responsible for buying and managing administrative systems
for over 30 universities and colleges in Norway. These systems perform opera-
tions related to management of finances, documents, and projects. The systems
run on different platforms and are located on servers with different physical lo-
cations and operators. As the systems are bought from different vendors and
use different databases, there is an obvious need for integration.
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Lately, UNINETT FAS has taken an interest in SOA and its advantages in inte-
gration. In section 2.3, some reasons for using SOA were presented. Three sys-
tem characteristics that SOA is especially good at handling were described [19]:
Complex distributed systems, different owners, and heterogeneity. Deciding
whether or not SOA is a good approach for UNINETT FAS is out of the scope
of this report. However, SOA seems to be able to handle many of the charac-
teristics that are evident in the IT architecture at UNINETT FAS.
UNINETT FAS is, however, as many organizations, concerned about the se-
curity aspects of SOA. In the previous chapters, I have tried to address this
concern by explaining the differences between SOA and traditional systems
with regard to security, describing countermeasures to common threats and
providing guidelines for development of secure service-oriented architectures.
Now it is time to demonstrate this in practice.
UNINETT FAS has provided me with a case scenario, which involves import of
personal information into multiple administrative systems. The same personal
information, such as names, addresses, phone numbers etc. need to be present
in multiple systems, and this should not have to be entered manually in each
system. UNINETT FAS wants to populate the systems with as little human
intervention as possible. The institutions (colleges and universities) should be
able to send information about persons to UNINETT FAS, which automatically
populates each system with the given information. UNINETT FAS wants to
see how a secure infrastructure for handling this process can be designed using
the SOA paradigm.
6.1.2 System Overview
UNINETT FAS would like to offer a service for importing information about
persons into multiple systems. Institutions should be able to import persons
by using a simple client application that communicates with the import ser-
vice. The client application should read an XML document containing a list
of persons, and invoke a specified service that handles the import process. In
return, the client application should receive a summary describing what was
done during the import process.
It is assumed that the administrative systems managed by UNINETT FAS
have dedicated services that offer functionality related to person management.
Quite a few vendors are beginning to expose some of their systems’ capabilities
as services out of the box [20]. In cases where these systems do not provide
dedicated services for this purpose, such services need to be made specifically.
The import service should make use of these services (henceforth called sys-
tem services) when importing persons. Figure 6.1 shows how UNINETT FAS
envisions the communication between the client application and the services.
The main tasks of the import service will be comparing received and currently
stored persons, and transforming personal data to formats that the commu-
nicating parties are able to understand. All services send and receive data
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Figure 6.1: An overview of the main services involved in import of information about
persons.
using XML-based technologies, however the format (XML Schema) used by the
system services may differ.
Institutions must authenticate when using the functionality of the import ser-
vice. This process should be made as easy as possible for the institutions, while
minimizing the amount of administration required. In addition, UNINETT FAS
does not rule out the possibility of offering additional services to the institutions
in the future. Thus, it should be easy to add new services to the architecture.
Also, UNINETT FAS wants to be able to keep track of events that occur on
each service.
As the messages that are sent between institutions and the import service con-
tain personal information, UNINETT FAS wants to keep messages confidential.
Also, care should be taken to ensure that it is not possible to modify the per-
sonal information or any other data while it is transferred between institutions
and the import service.
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6.2 Security Challenges
Now that we have a basic overview of the system, we can start thinking about
how to solve the security challenges of the SOA. In any form of software devel-
opment it is important to have security in mind during the entire development
process [28]. Thus, security guidelines should not be neglected in the require-
ments engineering phase. In this section, I will use my current knowledge of
the system that is to be built, and see what security guidelines can be applied
at this time.
Institutions need to authenticate when using the import service. Currently,
only one service is going to be made available to the institutions. However,
according to the system description, new services might be added in the future,
and the process of adding such services should be as easy as possible. According
to guideline SG4, centralize security, common security functionality such as
authentication should be centralized when many services are involved. I propose
using a dedicated security service for centralizing authentication in this system.
The security service should receive security credentials from a consumer, check
these credentials against a list of user entries and respond with a token that
serves as proof of the consumer’s identity. When the consumer calls a service,
it adds the token to the message, and the service is able to verify the identity
of the consumer based on the token. Figure 6.2 illustrates how the security
service should operate.
Figure 6.2: A consumer invokes the security service, requesting an identity token. The
security service authenticates and authorizes the consumer and returns a token. The
token can then be used when invoking other services.
According to the system description, events that occur on each service should be
easily monitored. This means that all events should be logged by the services.
Looking at the guidelines in section 5.2, we see that logging should be centralized
according to guideline SG5, centralize logging. This is needed to get the full
picture of what is going on in all services. A centralized logging facility is likely
to be reused, and thus it should be possible to add log entries by invoking a
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service. When adding the security service and a logging service to the service-
oriented architecture, we end up with a set of services as shown in figure 6.3.
Figure 6.3: The client application authenticates with the security service, and requests
an identity token. The client then invokes the import service with a list of persons,
and adds the identity token to the message as proof of its identity. The import service
verifies the identity token and authorizes the client. It may then invoke the system
services to perform the actual import. All events are logged to the logging service.
According to SG2 in section 5.2, we should assess the need for message-level
security. As the guideline says, one of the main causes for using message-level
security is to protect data against untrusted intermediary services. In our case
scenario, there are no untrusted intermediary services. The import service
acts as an intermediary between the institutions and the system services, but
we trust the import service not to eavesdrop on or tamper with messages.
Because of this, transport-level security is sufficient for protecting the data
flow between institutions and the system services. Transport-level security has
better performance than message-level security, and is often better supported
[19]. Thus, transport-level security is the best choice in our scenario.
Message-level security is however needed for identity tokens that are issued by
the security service. If identity tokens are not signed, consumers can tamper
with tokens before they are sent to a service. Consumers may do this to grant
themselves access to operations other than what they have been authorized to
perform. Because of this, the security service needs to sign all tokens that are
issued, and services need to verify the signature when receiving tokens from
consumers.
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6.3 Requirements
This section details the requirements of the SOA-based system that is to be
built. I will be using use cases, or more specifically misuse cases, for document-
ing the requirements of the SOA solution. Misuse cases will allow me to relate
threats and countermeasures to functionality in a way that is easily compre-
hensible. Use cases and misuse cases are described only briefly here. Refer to
Vidgen [44], and Sindre and Opdahl [37] for a more in-depth description of use
cases and misuse cases.
Use cases are a common technique for specifying, documenting, and communi-
cating requirements. A use case typically represents some functionality as per-
ceived by the user [44]. Use cases are often documented using both a textual
description and an UML diagram1. The use case notation comprises actors,
use cases, and associations. Figure 6.4 illustrates the use case diagramming
notation.
Figure 6.4: The use case diagramming notation.
While use cases are suitable for most functional requirements, they may lead
to neglect of extra-functional requirements, such as security requirements [37].
For a closer integration between functional and extra-functional requirements,
Sindre and Opdahl [37] describe another approach called misuse cases. Misuse
cases are a systematic approach to eliciting security requirements based on use
cases. In misuse cases, traditional use cases are extended to also cover misuse.
Misuse cases model both functionality and threats of a system. New concepts
such as misusers and misuse cases are added to the existing UML definitions
of actors and use cases. A misuse case is a sequence of actions performed by
a misuser, with the intention of causing harm to a system. Countermeasures
to threats posed by a misuser are modeled as use cases. Misuse cases threaten
use cases, and use cases mitigate misuse cases. Figure 6.5 illustrates the misuse
case diagramming notation. Note that I have omitted the threaten relation in
the misuse case diagrams in this report to avoid cluttering.
In addition to misuse case diagrams I have provided lightweight textual mis-
use case descriptions for each service. This lightweight approach embeds the
1The Unified Modeling Language (UML) is a modeling notation that has gained widespread
acceptance for the analysis and design of software systems [44].
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Figure 6.5: The misuse case diagramming notation.
description of misuse cases within a regular use case template [37]. These de-
scriptions can be found in appendix A.
The following use cases are described in this section:
• UC1: Import persons
A consumer invokes the import service, submitting a list of persons for
import. The import service invokes one or more system services to retrieve
the current lists of persons. The import service then compares the new
and current list of persons, and invokes the system services to update the
person registries.
• UC2: Authenticate consumer
A consumer invokes the security service, requesting an identity token.
The security service reads the request, authenticates the consumer, and
responds with an identity token that can be used when invoking other
services.
• UC3: Add log entry
A consumer invokes the logging service, requesting that a log entry should
be stored. The logging service logs the event and replies with a status
code indicating whether the event was logged or not.
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6.3.1 UC1: Import Persons
Figure 6.6: Misuse case diagram for UC1: Import persons
The misuse case shown in figure 6.6 illustrates the threats and countermeasures
that are related to the process of importing persons:
• A malicious user may perform metacharacter injection, such as SQL and
XPath injection. To mitigate this attack, it is clear from the figure that
input to the service should be validated.
• The consumer might have tampered with the identity token that have
been issued by the security service. To counter this, the digital signature
of the identity token is verified by the import service.
• Eavesdropping of data is also a threat, in which the attacker could be
able to both look at personal information and steal identity tokens that
are transmitted. A secure channel is used to counter eavesdropping.
• An attacker could tamper with data that is being sent between the con-
sumer and the import service. Tampering of data is countered using a
secure channel.
• An attacker could flood the service2, which is a threat that is countered
using a firewall to filter requests, or using load balancing.
2Note that while I recognize that the threat of service flooding (DDoS) exists in this
system, I will not describe how to counter it in later chapters. This threat is countered
using mechanisms that are applied either by the host running the service or in the network
infrastructure, and thus it does not greatly affect how services are designed.
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6.3.2 UC2: Authenticate Consumer
Figure 6.7: Misuse case diagram for UC2: Authenticate consumer
Figure 6.7 shows the threats and countermeasures that can be related to au-
thentication of consumers:
• As was also the case for import of persons, a malicious user can try to
inject metacharacters together with data that are sent to the service. In
this case, such injections could be used as a means of gaining unauthorized
access. The input to the service need to be validated to mitigate this
attack.
• The consumer of the security service may try to tamper with an identity
token to get unauthorized access to services. This is countered by using
digital signatures.
• Replay attacks, described in chapter 4, can also be performed for gain-
ing unauthorized access. Replay attacks are mitigated by using a secure
channel.
• While usernames and passwords are transmitted between the consumer
and the security service, these credentials can be stolen. A secure channel
is used for countering this.
• While identity tokens are transmitted between the consumer and the se-
curity service, these tokens can be stolen by an outside attacker. A secure
channel is used for countering this.
• Flooding of the service is countered using firewalls and load balancing.
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6.3.3 UC3: Add Log Entry
Figure 6.8: Misuse case diagram for UC3: Add log entry
The misuse case diagram in figure 6.8 shows threats and countermeasures re-
lated to logging of events:
• A consumer can try to inject metacharacters together with log events that
are sent to the service. The input to the service needs to be validated to
mitigate this attack.
• An outside attacker may try to tamper with log events that are sent from
the consumer to the service. This may be performed to hide attacks on
other services. A secure channel is used for mitigating this attack.
• An outside attacker may eavesdrop on log events that are sent from the
consumer to the service. By doing this, the attacker can get information
regarding the implementation of the SOA, or read personal information
that might be logged. This is countered using a secure channel.
• An outside attacker may try to steal authentication information as it is
transmitted between the consumer and the service. A secure channel is
used for countering this.
• Flooding of the service is countered using firewalls and load balancing.
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6.4 Summary
In this chapter, the requirements of the service-oriented architecture have been
identified.
After applying some of the SOA security guidelines in section 5.2, we found that
two additional services were needed in our architecture: A security service that
helps centralizing authentication, and a logging service that enables centraliza-
tion of logging. In addition, we assessed the need for message-level security,
and found that transport-level security is sufficient in this scenario. However,
message-level security is needed for signing of identity tokens that are issued
by the security service. Table 6.1 summarizes the use of security guidelines in
this chapter.
ID Name Practical use
SG4 Centralize secu-
rity
Using a security service for authenticating ser-
vice consumers.
SG5 Centralize logging Sending log events to a centralized logging ser-
vice.
SG2 Assess the need
for message-level
security
Transport-level security is sufficient, except
when exchanging identity tokens.
Table 6.1: Security guidelines applied during requirements engineering.
In section 6.3, security requirements were identified using misuse cases. One
misuse case diagram was presented for each service to illustrate the threats and
countermeasures that are related to our SOA.
Now that the requirements have been identified, we can move on to the design
of the service-oriented architecture.
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Chapter 7
Design
In the previous chapter, the requirements and threats of our SOA were identi-
fied. I will now describe design of the SOA by taking these requirements and
threats into account.
The chapter begins by identifying the standards that will be used for realiz-
ing the SOA. After the standards have been identified, we are able to decide
which existing technologies, such as platforms and frameworks, that best suite
our needs. When both the standards and the technologies are known, we can
move on to describing the actual design of our services. Throughout the whole
chapter, special attention will be given to the adherence to security guidelines.
The chapter ends with a summary of the guidelines that have been used during
the design phase.
7.1 Standards
Guideline SG1, retain interoperability when handling security, in section 5.2,
states that open and widely accepted security standards should be used when
realizing a SOA. In this section, I will list the standards that will be used in this
system, and explain why they have been chosen. When selecting appropriate
XML-based standards, I have focused on standards that are defined by W3C
and OASIS. These standards are open and expected to be supported in many
situations.
7.1.1 Web Services
Web Services, described in chapter 3, are the most popular way of implementing
SOA [20]. It is therefore the most natural technology to use when demonstrating
SOA security in practice. Web Services are realized using a set of specific
standards which are used to enable interoperable interaction.
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The requirements specification in chapter 6 detailed three services: An import
service, a security service, and a logging service. All of these services will be
implemented as Web Services, using the standards described in chapter 3.
7.1.2 WS-Security
WS-Security, described in section 3.3.1, defines a SOAP header element for
making security claims [20]. Instead of adding security information to the body
of SOAP messages, we use WS-Security as it expresses security information in
a standardized way that is widely understood. In addition, by keeping security
information out of the body of messages, security is not processed as part of
business operations. This is in line with guideline SG3 in section 5.2, handle
security outside of business operations.
As seen from the requirements specification in chapter 6, we will need to make
several security claims in our SOA:
• Institutions must claim their identity when authenticating with the secu-
rity service. This will be done using usernames and passwords.
• Institutions must claim their identity when using the import service, and
also prove that they are authorized to use it.
• The security service must prove that identity tokens have not been tam-
pered with by signing the tokens and adding information required for
verification of the signature.
WS-Security allows all of these claims to be added to the SOAP header.
7.1.3 XML Signature
XML Signature, described in section 3.3.3, allows digital signatures to be ex-
pressed using XML [20]. Such signatures can be added to the header of SOAP
messages using WS-Security, and can be used to detect if some part of a message
has been tampered with.
In the requirements specification in chapter 6, I found that transport-level secu-
rity will suffice in this SOA. This means that SSL/TLS can be used instead of
digital signatures. However, there was one exception: The identity tokens that
are issued by the security service. These tokens need to be digitally signed to
detect potential tampering. We will be using XML Signature to sign identity
tokens.
7.1.4 SAML
SAML, described in section 3.3.4, is a language that can be used to assert secu-
rity information about a subject [20]. This information is communicated using
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SAML assertions. These assertions may contain the identity of the subject,
permissions, email addresses, and other useful information.
The requirements specification in chapter 6 stated that a central security ser-
vice should be used for authentication and authorization of institutions. This
security service should issue identity tokens that institutions could use to prove
their identity when accessing the import service. These identity tokens can be
expressed as SAML assertions.
The security service is responsible for issuing SAML assertions, and should sup-
port authentication and authorization requests through a standardized inter-
face. The SAML protocol, introduced in section 3.3.4, can be used for issuing,
validation, renewal, and cancellation of SAML assertions. The SAML proto-
col provides exactly the interface we need for communicating authentication
requests and assertions between consumers and the security service.
7.1.5 SSL/TLS
We will be relying on transport-level security for countering eavesdropping and
tampering of data. Transport-level security has better performance and is of-
ten better supported than message-level security [19]. Thus, it is wise to use
transport-level security when message-level security is not required. SSL/TLS
is commonly used for security on the transport-level, and is widely used for
secure communication on the Internet. This means that it is likely to be sup-
ported by most web servers and clients. SSL/TLS also protects against replay
attacks [48], which was identified as a threat in chapter 6.
A few steps need to be taken before SSL/TLS can be utilized. Each service
should have its own SSL certificate. A self-signed certificate can be generated
using the keytool application that is bundled with Java [20]. In addition, the
consumers that are going to invoke the services must be configured to trust the
certificates.
7.2 Technologies
As stated by guideline GG10 in section 5.1, it is good practice to use exist-
ing community resources instead of designing home-brew solutions. This sec-
tion presents the main technologies that we will use for developing the service-
oriented architecture.
When working with service-oriented architectures, there are a lot of platforms
and libraries that can be used. Many commercial vendors offer products related
to SOA. However, in this thesis I will focus on open source software. The
platforms and libraries used in this project have been chosen primarily based
on security requirements and the author’s prior knowledge and experience.
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7.2.1 The Java Platform
In theory, the choice of a programming platform is not as critical in SOA as
in traditional application development. No matter what platform we choose,
services and consumers should be expected to interoperate well with those writ-
ten on other platforms [20]. However, there are some aspects that need to be
considered when choosing a programming platform. Mainstream programming
platforms for SOA are Microsoft’s .NET platform and Java Enterprise Edi-
tion, but relevant tools are also written for C/C++ [2] [3]. As mentioned in
section 4.3, one of the countermeasures to buffer overflow attacks is to use type-
safe languages. Because of this, C/C++ should be avoided if possible. I will
focus on open source frameworks and libraries in this project, which means that
the Java platform is a good choice.
7.2.2 Apache CXF
The SOA will be designed using Web Services, which means that we need a
framework that can help us build such services. At the moment, there are many
open source Web Service frameworks to choose from. The Apache Software
Foundation maintains an updated list [6] of frameworks and the features they
support. Three of the most prominent frameworks at the time of writing are
Apache Axis 1.x, Apache Axis2, and Apache CXF. I will briefly describe these
frameworks here.
Apache Axis 1.x [2] is one of the older frameworks and supports the most basic
features and standards. While Axis 1.x is stable and described in some books,
like SOA Security [20] by Kanneganti and Chodavarapu, it it is no longer under
active development. Apache Axis2 [3] is a redesign of Axis 1.x and supports
many of the latest standards [6]. Axis2 has some advantages over Axis 1.x, such
as high performance and hot deployment.
Apache CXF [4] is one of the most recent efforts in the field of open source
Web Service frameworks. It is the offspring of two older Web Service projects,
namely XFire and Celtix [41]. Some of the advantages of Apache CXF are ease
of use, good support for Web Service standards and high performance [4]. I
have decided to use Apache CXF for Web Service development, mainly because
of its ease of use and Spring-based configuration1.
Before continuing, a few words need to be said about the interceptor chain
of Apache CXF. Interceptors are fundamental processing units inside Apache
CXF. When a service is invoked, an interceptor chain is created and invoked
[4]. Each interceptor on the chain gets a chance to do what it wants with a
message, which includes operations such as reading, transformation, and header
1Spring is a Java/JEE application framework that claims to increase development produc-
tivity and runtime performance while improving test coverage and application quality [39].
Spring is often referred to as a dependency injection framework because of its ability to link
objects together using XML files.
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processing. I will use interceptors to add security functionality to services.
This is in line with SOA security guideline SG3, handle security outside of
business operations, as security functionality is placed outside of the service
implementation class. Figure 7.1 illustrates how interceptors are connected to
the service class.
Figure 7.1: In Apache CXF, SOAP messages that arrive to the service are processed
by a chain of interceptors. After the service implementation class has been invoked, a
new set of interceptors process SOAP messages on their way out.
Interceptors can be configured for both services and client applications. A large
set of interceptors are included with the Apache CXF distribution. Among
these are two interceptors for handling inbound and outbound WS-Security
processing respectively. These are described in section 7.2.3.
7.2.3 WSS4J
Apache CXF makes use of many underlying libraries for creating services. One
of these is WSS4J (Web Services Security for Java) which is used for generation,
signing, and verification of WS-Security information within SOAP messages [5].
WSS4J is also being used by Axis 1.x, Axis2 and XFire, which means that the
WS-Security support and configuration in these frameworks are very similar.
According to guideline SG1, retain interoperability when handling security, in-
teroperability should not suffer because of security. Thus, we should find out if
WSS4J is interoperable with other Web Services frameworks or libraries. Ver-
sion 1.5 of WSS4J can be configured to be compliant with the WS-I Basic
Security Profile [5]. This means that it is interoperable with other software
that is compliant with the Basic Security Profile.
Configuration of WSS4J is done through the interceptors that is included in
the Apache CXF distribution. Two interceptors, WSS4JInInterceptor and
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WSS4JOutInterceptor, process SOAP messages on their way in and out. Set-
tings such as location of keys for encryption and signing may be specified in
configuration files [4].
7.2.4 Log4J
As can be seen from the requirements specification in chapter 6, the SOA should
use a dedicated logging service for centralizing logging. This service will receive
log events from multiple services and store them centrally for easier monitoring
and attack detection/recovery.
To ease development and configuration, an existing logging framework named
Log4J will be used. This framework can be configured to use different types of
appenders for logging to the console, files or databases. Uria [43] describes an
appender that sends log events to a Web Service. This appender can be used
on all hosts where services are deployed. It can be configured to log events
that correspond to specific levels (e.g. info, warning, and error) or events that
originate from specific Java classes. By using a strict configuration, only specific
events can be logged to avoid overloading the logging service.
7.2.5 Input Validation Framework
Guideline GG9, be reluctant to trust states that user input should not be
trusted, and that it should be validated before being used. In doing this, we
face the challenge of having multiple services and thus multiple entrances to
applications. This means that handling input validation in one place, as would
be normal in traditional architectures, becomes difficult.
According to guideline SG4, centralize security, we should try to centralize se-
curity functionality when possible. In his master’s thesis, Jensen [18] has devel-
oped an input validation framework for Web Services. He hints at the possibility
of making a central validation service based on this framework. However, there
are some potential problems of such a solution. Every message would have to
be routed through the validation service, and performance or the possibility of
denial of service attacks might be an issue.
The services in our SOA have different operations and XML Schemas, which
means that a different validation configuration for each service needs to be made
in any case. One might also assume that the validation configurations do not
need to be frequently modified after deployment. Because of this, instead of
using a central validation service, we will validate input in each service by using
Jensen’s input validation framework [18].
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7.3 Service Design
Now that we have identified which standards and technologies to use in the
development of our SOA, we can move on to the design of the individual services.
The services have individual security mechanisms, and this section describes
how these mechanisms are realized in each service. In addition, the business
logic of the services is briefly described.
7.3.1 Import Service
When invoked, the import service receives a SOAP message from the consumer.
The body of this message contains the list of persons that should be imported,
while the header of the message contains a signed SAML assertion. The con-
sumer must provide this assertion to prove his or her identity to the import
service. To avoid eavesdropping and tampering of data during transmission,
a secure channel (SSL/TLS) is used for exchanging messages between the two
parties. Figure 7.2 illustrates the communication between a consumer and the
import service.
Figure 7.2: A consumer sends a SOAP message to the import service. The message
body contains a list of persons, and the header contains a signed SAML assertion. The
import service responds with a list of results.
Upon receiving the message from the consumer, the import service performs a
set of security checks. As described in section 7.2.2, we are using interceptors
to add security functionality to our services. Figure 7.3 illustrates the three
interceptors that are used by the import service.
First of all, the message must be validated to counter metacharacter injection
attacks. This is done as early as possible to minimize unvalidated processing
of data. The import service uses a ValidationInterceptor to validate the
contents of messages. This interceptor is configured to use the input validation
framework provided by Jensen [18]. Following validation, the signature of the
SAML assertion must be verified to ensure that the assertion has not been tam-
pered with. The WSS4JInInterceptor that is included in Apache CXF is con-
figured to do this. However, this interceptor is not able to process the contents
of SAML assertions, and thus an additional interceptor, SAMLInInterceptor,
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Figure 7.3: An incoming SOAP message to the import service is processed by three
interceptors to perform validation of data, verification of the digital signature, and
processing of the SAML assertion.
is used to authorize the consumer.
When the service implementation class is invoked, all security processing has
been performed, and the implementation class can concentrate on the business
logic. We have successfully been able to handle security outside of the business
logic as recommended by guideline SG3 in section 5.2.
As described in chapter 6, the import service invokes other services for doing
the actual import. These services, which are referred to as system services in
this report, are assumed to be provided by system vendors. If we made the
system services ourselves, we could propagate the SAML assertion from the
import service request to the system service requests. However, as the system
services are made by different vendors, they use different security mechanisms.
Thus, we cannot assume that the system services support SAML. Instead, the
import service needs to be configured to invoke the system services using the
security mechanisms that they require.
I will briefly describe the classes that perform the business logic inside the
import service. Figure 7.4 shows a class diagram, illustrating the main classes
and their relations.
Four classes and one interface are depicted in the class diagram:
• ImportServiceImpl is the main service class, and implements the meth-
ods that are available to service consumers. The method importPersons()
calls the PersonImporter class to start the import process.
• PersonImporter is responsible for carrying out the import process. It
contains a set of SystemClient instances, and uses these instances to
read and modify data about persons. In addition, it makes use of a
PersonComparator that compares current and new data.
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Figure 7.4: The classes that perform the business logic of the import service.
• PersonComparator compares two lists of person instances, and identifies
new, removed, and updated persons.
• SystemClient is an interface that contains methods for retrieval and mod-
ification of personal information.
• SystemClientImpl is a client implementation class that invokes a system
service to read and modify personal information. Each system service has
a corresponding SystemClient implementation class such as this.
Each client implementation class needs to be configured to be able to authenti-
cate with their respective system services. The Spring framework allows us to
specify this in an XML configuration file [39].
This has been a quick description of the design of the import service. Now, let
us move on to the security service.
7.3.2 Security Service
The security service utilizes the SAML protocol for communicating identity to-
kens. It receives a SOAP message from a consumer, where the body contains
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a SAML request, and the header contains the username and password of the
consumer. The security service responds with a signed SAML assertion describ-
ing the consumer in question. The consumer can then use the SAML assertion
for authentication and authorization with other services. Figure 7.5 shows the
communication between a consumer and the security service. A secure channel
(SSL/TLS) is used for exchanging messages between the two parties.
Figure 7.5: A consumer sends a SOAP message to the security service. The body
of this message contains a SAML request, and the header contains the username and
password of the consumer. The security service returns a signed SAML assertion back
to the consumer.
After receiving the SOAP message from the consumer, the security service
performs a set of security checks. Similar to the import service, the security
service performs security processing in interceptors. The interceptors involved
in security processing are illustrated in figure 7.6.
Figure 7.6: An incoming SOAP message to the security service is processed by two
interceptors to perform validation of data and authentication of the consumer. The
WSS4JInInterceptor is configured to check the username and password against the
user database.
To counter the threat of metacharacter injection, all input from the consumer
is validated. This is performed in a ValidationInterceptor. In addition, the
username and password of the consumer is checked against a user database.
This is done by configuring the WSS4JInInterceptor to communicate with
the database. After the service implementation class is done processing the
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message, an additional interceptor is needed for signing the SAML assertion
that is sent back to the consumer. WSS4JOutInterceptor is configured to do
this.
When the service implementation class is invoked, the SAML issuing process
begins. The interceptors have verified that the consumer is authorized to invoke
the security service, but no SAML assertion has been made. The business logic
of the security service takes care of this. One might argue that issuing of SAML
assertions is a security operation, and that according to guideline SG3, handle
security outside of business operations, we should not issue assertions as part
of the business logic. However, in this case, security is the business operation
of the service. Thus, in the case of the security service, we can justify issuing
SAML assertions as part of the business logic.
I will briefly describe the classes involved in issuing of SAML assertions. The
class diagram in figure 7.7 shows an overview of the most important classes.
Figure 7.7: The classes that are involved in issuing of SAML assertions.
Three classes are depicted in the class diagram:
• SecurityServiceImpl is the main service class, and implements the meth-
ods that are available to service consumers. The method invokeRequest()
receives a request, connects to the UserDatabase and uses SAMLIssuer to
issue SAML assertions based on the information found in the database.
• UserDatabase is responsible for communication with the database, and
returns authentication and authorization information that can be used
when issuing assertions.
• SAMLIssuer generates the actual SAML assertions. It receives authen-
tication and authorization information regarding a user, and generates
assertion based on this information.
The UserDatabase needs to be configured to connect to the database. The
Spring framework allows us to configure this in an XML configuration file.
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When using configuration files that contain security information such as a pass-
word for connecting to the database, it is important to consider guideline GG4,
follow the principle of least privilege. The configuration file must be readable
only to the security service.
7.3.3 Logging Service
The logging service receives a SOAP message from the consumer, containing a
log event in the message body. In return, the consumer receives a result indi-
cating whether the event was successfully logged or not. The logging service
differs from other services in that it is invoked directly by systems. No external
consumers or individuals will be invoking the logging service, and thus there is
no need to rely on the security service and SAML for authentication. Instead,
consumers must present a trusted public key certificate (SSL client certificate)
when invoking the logging service. Authentication based on client certificates
is a technically superior to most other authentication schemes [20]. Similar to
the other services, a secure channel (SSL/TLS) is used for exchanging mes-
sages between a consumer and the logging service. Figure 7.8 illustrates the
communication between the two parties.
Figure 7.8: A consumer sends a SOAP message to the logging service. The body
of the message contains an event that should be logged. In this case there are no
header elements, as authentication is performed on the transport level using SSL client
certificates. The logging service responds with a result, indicating whether or not the
event was logged.
Yet again interceptors are used for security processing of SOAP messages. How-
ever, the logging service authenticates consumers on the transport level using
SSL client certificates, which means that interceptors for authentication and
authorization are not required. The logging service only has one interceptor,
ValidationInterceptor. Figure 7.9 illustrates this.
One might argue that validation of log events is not necessary, as these messages
originate from trusted systems. However, imagine a situation where a system
logs attack attempts and forwards these logs to the logging service. If some of
these attack attempts contain metacharacters, this may affect both the logging
service and a potential user interface that parses the logs. Because of this,
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Figure 7.9: An incoming message to the logging service is processed by one interceptor,
ValidationInterceptor, that validates the data of the message.
incoming messages to the logging service need to be validated. This is in line
with guideline GG9, be reluctant to trust, in section 5.1.
I have not provided a class diagram for the business logic of the logging service,
as the business logic consists of only one class, namely LoggingServiceImpl.
This class reads the log event from the incoming message and simply logs it
using the Log4J framework. Log4J can then be configured to log the event to
different locations using different formats.
7.4 Summary
In this chapter, I have described the design of a simple service-oriented archi-
tecture.
Before designing the services, I identified the standards and technologies that
were best suited for this specific SOA. Open and widely adopted standards
were chosen to minimize potential interoperability problems. The Apache CXF
framework was used for Web Services development, and allows us to handle
security outside of business operations by using interceptors. Log4J is a logging
framework that can be configured to log to multiple places, including remote
Web Services. In addition, an input validation framework were used for vali-
dating input in each service.
I have not implemented the entire SOA-solution that has been described in
this chapter. However, I have provided a few implementation examples in ap-
pendix B. These examples include WSDL documents describing all services, a
validation interceptor, a SAML interceptor, a Web Services logging appender,
and an example of service configuration.
Even though this SOA is relatively small, we have seen that many security
considerations come into play. Table 7.1 summarizes the security guidelines
that have been applied when designing the SOA.
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ID Name Practical use
SG1 Retain interoper-
ability when han-
dling security
Security standards defined by W3C and OASIS
are used. The WSS4J library can be configured
to be compliant with the WS-I Basic Security
Profile for interoperability with other platforms
and frameworks.
SG3 Handle security
outside of busi-
ness operations
Security claims are inserted to the header of
SOAP messages. Interceptors are used to do
security processing before and after the service
implementation class is invoked.
GG4 Follow the princi-
ple of least privi-
lege
Configuration files containing passwords are
readable only to the service in question.
GG9 Be reluctant to
trust
All input to the services is validated, regardless
of who the consumer is.
GG10 Use community
resources
Existing community resources are chosen in-
stead of designing home-brew solutions.
Table 7.1: Security guidelines applied during design.
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Discussion
In this chapter, I will discuss the security guidelines that I have proposed, and
mention how they may affect other aspects of a SOA. In addition, I will briefly
comment on the experiences that I have had with frameworks and libraries
during this project.
8.1 The Benefit of Having Security Guidelines
In chapter 4, threats and countermeasures related to SOA were presented. It
turns out that many of the threats that are present in traditional systems are
also relevant in SOA. In fact, I have found only one threat that is specific
to SOA, which is service description scanning attacks. XPath injection, entity
recursion, and external entity attacks are especially relevant in SOA as they ex-
ploit vulnerabilities related to XML-processing, but other than that, the threats
in chapter 4 are well-known in traditional systems [1] [40]. However, I found
that different countermeasures are needed for countering some of the threats.
In addition, the nature of SOA leads to new approaches for handling security
functionality such as authentication and authorization.
What I gather from this is that people who are new to SOA will have few
problems understanding the threats that are evident in such architectures. If a
person has dealt with security in other kinds of systems, most of the threats will
be familiar. However, as countermeasures may differ from those of traditional
systems, persons who are new to SOA will need to gain some knowledge on how
to apply countermeasures to threats in SOA. Similarly, as new approaches are
introduced for handling security functionality, newcomers will need to familiar-
ize themselves with these approaches.
This shows that people who are new to SOA will benefit from having a set of
security guidelines when developing SOA-based systems. In my thesis, I have
made such guidelines and demonstrated how they can be applied in a real-world
case scenario.
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8.2 Practical Use of My Guidelines
Faced with the challenge of developing a SOA, how difficult is it to use my
security guidelines during the development process? To answer this question,
we need to look at how the guidelines are written. Each guideline has a de-
scriptive title and is written in a short and concise way, describing the reason
why the guideline should be applied, and of course how it may be applied.
As a result, anyone involved in the development of a SOA can quickly glance
through the guidelines at any time during development. This reduces the pos-
sibility of forgetting important security aspects, and makes sure that security
is appropriately handled.
The security guidelines do not refer to any other chapters or sections of my
thesis. This is done on purpose to avoid dependencies between the guidelines
and the rest of the report. As a result, the guidelines can easily be taken out
of the context of this report and be used independently as a brief overview of
how to solve security challenges in SOA.
As mentioned, the guidelines are short and concise. While this is good in many
cases, it can also be seen as a disadvantage. Detailed information on how to
apply the guidelines are omitted. This means that using guidelines as the only
means of gaining SOA-related security knowledge is not enough. For instance,
one should also have knowledge of security standards and how to use them. In
this respect, section 3.3 is a good starting point for anyone new to SOA, or
more specifically Web Services.
In chapters 6 and 7, I have demonstrated how to use my guidelines. As can be
seen from these chapters, there is no streamlined process for applying guidelines.
The guidelines are simply used when appropriate. For instance, when the issue
of handling authentication in multiple services comes up, the list of guidelines
is consulted, and it becomes clear that authentication is best handled centrally.
Remember that guidelines are just recommendations for what to do and what
not to do in a certain context [28]. Thus, it is natural to simply use them when
appropriate.
8.3 The Side Effects of Centralization
Two of my security guidelines, SG4 and SG5 in section 5.2, recommend central-
izing security and logging. While this makes the security enforcements easier
to maintain, and allows for better monitoring, it also has a few side effects.
Performance might be an issue, depending on how the central security and
logging facilities are realized. In chapters 6 and 7, I have used a dedicated
Web Service for centralization. Web Services need to parse XML data when
receiving requests, resulting in a more resource intensive processing as opposed
to for example a simple HTTP request. This may have a negative impact
on performance if a large number of consumers use the security and logging
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services simultaneously. Especially, the logging service might be affected, as
each event occurring in each service is logged. An attacker might also exploit
this by sending a large number of requests to these services, effectively launching
a (distributed) denial of service attack. This threat, including measures for
countering it, was described in section 4.7.
In the case scenario described in this report, performance is not expected to be
a problem, as the number of services in the SOA are limited. However, as more
services are added to the SOA, one might have to consider other strategies for
centralization. Mallery [27] suggests using a network gateway that processes
incoming and outgoing messages to the SOA. Such advanced gateways are able
to process XML data more effectively, and can be configured to process SOAP
headers and issue identity tokens. However, such solutions need to be acquired
from a vendor. As mentioned in section 1.3, I have decided not to look at
commercial solutions in this report.
8.4 Security Standards and Interoperability
Guideline SG1 recommends retaining interoperability while handling security
by using open and widely adopted standards. In addition, it states that one
should focus on compliance with the WS-I Basic Security Profile for promoting
interoperability between different implementations of standards. While these
recommendations help making services and consumers more interoperable, they
cannot guarantee full interoperability. The reason for this is simple: Different
services may use different security mechanisms.
A good example of this can be seen in the SOA that have been described in
this report. I mentioned this briefly in section 7.3.1. While the import service
require that a SAML assertion is used for proving a consumer’s identity and
authorizations, the system services (provided by vendors) cannot be expected
to support such assertions. This means that the import service cannot propa-
gate the SAML assertions received from the institutions when interacting with
the system services. The import service has no other choice than to use the
authentication mechanisms required by the system services. As a result, the
security credentials required by the system services need to be known by the
import service.
Instead of specifying the security credentials in the configuration of intermediary
services, such as the import service, Dushin and Newcomer [11] suggest using a
data structure for handling multiple credential types and formats in the same
request. By using this approach, the import service could receive both a SAML
assertion and any other credentials required by the system services. However,
this would potentially result in added complexity for consumers of the import
service, as many credentials need to be added to each message.
This shows that the interoperability concern can involve more considerations
than just choosing the right standards and ensuring compliance of implemen-
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tations.
8.5 Experiences with Frameworks and Libraries
In this project, I have used a few frameworks and libraries when demonstrating
how to design a SOA. While I have not implemented the entire system, I have
made some implementation examples, as shown in appendix B. When making
these examples, I had to make practical use of the frameworks and libraries
described in chapter 7. This has given me the opportunity to share some of the
experiences that I have had with these tools.
Getting started with the Apache CXF Web Services framework is not hard.
People who are familiar with the basic standards of Web Services will have few
problems developing simple Web Services, as the Apache CXF web page [4]
provides good tutorials that guide you through the process of service develop-
ment. However, once you start developing more complex services, things tend
to get difficult. The documentation provided on the Apache CXF web page
only serves as an introduction, and at the time of writing, some sections are
still under construction. Because of this, I had to download the source code of
Apache CXF and look through it on some occasions.
The Web Services security library, WSS4J, suffered from the same problems
as Apache CXF. Simple scenarios such as sending and verifying a username
and password using WS-Security is documented, but once things like SAML
assertions are being used, you might have to figure things out by looking though
the WSS4J source code.
In my experience, the documentation of Apache CXF and WSS4J has not yet
caught up with the functionality of these tools. What impact does these issues
have on security? As developers have difficulties finding information on how to
implement certain functionality, they might resort to trial and error for making
things work. This can result in implementations that are vulnerable, while at
the same time seemingly work as intended. Thus, thorough testing is important
for identifying vulnerabilities in such implementations.
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Conclusion
Service-oriented architecture is an interesting paradigm for combining and reusing
functionality across applications, technologies, and organizations. However, if
organizations decide to adopt SOA, they need to be aware of the security chal-
lenges that come with this paradigm. SOA differ from traditional systems in
ways that affect how security is handled. In a large or complex SOA, new
approaches are needed for ensuring confidentiality and integrity of data, and
handling authentication, authorization, and logging. If adopters of SOA do not
have a clear understanding of these new approaches, they risk ending up with
a set of services that are either vulnerable to attacks or difficult to manage.
In this thesis, I have identified security challenges, standards, threats, and coun-
termeasures that are related to SOA, especially focusing on the differences be-
tween SOA and traditional systems. Based on this knowledge, I have created
five guidelines that provide recommendations for how to handle security in a
SOA. These guidelines should be applied during requirements engineering and
design. Web Services are the most popular way of realizing SOA in practice,
but other technologies can also be used. Because of this, I have made sure that
my SOA security guidelines do not assume any specific implementation. As a
result, the guidelines can be applied regardless of the technology that is used for
SOA development. The guidelines are written in a short and concise way, and
can be taken out of the context of this report and used without modifications.
In specific, the guidelines recommend retaining interoperability, assessing the
need for message-level security, handling security outside of business operations,
centralizing security, and centralizing logging. By demonstrating the use of
these guidelines in a real-world case scenario, I have shown that the guidelines
are helpful during development of a SOA. Using these guidelines as a reference
during requirements engineering and design, the right decisions with regard to
security in service-oriented architectures are made. As a result, vulnerabilities
and bad security design choices can be avoided.
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Chapter 10
Further Work
I have identified some possible further work that can be performed in relation
to this project:
1. Finalize implementation
In this report, I have described development of a service-oriented archi-
tecture, and implemented some of its functionality. The next step with
regard to this SOA is obviously to finalize its implementation. Appendix B
contain WSDL documents for all services. Skeletons for implementation
classes of services and consumers can be generated automatically by using
these documents together with a tool. In addition, interceptors for han-
dling security functionality has been implemented. Thus, the work that
remains is primarily implementation of the business logic of services and
consumers.
2. Evaluate the security in Web Services frameworks
As described in section 7.2.2, there are a lot of open source Web Services
frameworks to choose from. Future studies could look at how security
is handled in one or more of these frameworks, find out what standards
and features are supported, and assess aspects such as ease of use, default
security settings, and quality of documentation.
3. Survey of SOA adoption and security approaches
Kontogiannis et al. [22] mentions that there has been a significant growth
in the development of SOA-based systems over the past decade. However,
I have yet to see any specific numbers indicating the degree of SOA adop-
tion. A survey could be performed to examine the current adoption of
SOA in Norwegian organizations. In addition to the degree of adoption,
it would be interesting to see what approaches organizations choose for
realizing SOA in practice - especially with regard to security.
4. Approaches to Logging and Monitoring in SOA
One of my security guidelines recommend centralizing logging in SOA.
In this report, I have realized this in practice by using a dedicated log-
ging service. However, this is not necessarily the best way to centralize
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logging in SOA. If a large number of services are present, there might
be performance issues, as discussed in chapter 8. Future studies could
look at approaches to logging and monitoring in SOA, and identify ad-
vantages and disadvantages of each approach with regard to aspects such
as performance, security, and interoperability.
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Appendix A
Use Case and Misuse Case
Descriptions
This chapter contains textual use case and misuse case descriptions for the
SOA-based system described in this report. Use case descriptions are normally
seen from the perspective of the user of the system [44]. I have described the
activities involved in the use cases in a more detailed fashion to show exactly
what happens as a result of consumer-service interaction. W3C provides Web
Service use case examples that are written in a similar level of detail [14].
Services in a SOA can be used in multiple contexts. For instance, the security
service may be used for authentication in a process involving storage or retrieval
of documents, and the logging service may be used to log events occurring in
normal web applications. These services might one day be involved in other op-
erations than import of personal data, and because of this, use case descriptions
of these services should be as general as possible. Today, the import service will
only be invoked by the client application. In the future, however, this service
might be invoked by other consumers, and thus the import service needs to
have its own use case description.
I have added two new columns to extend the use case descriptions to misuse
case descriptions, namely threats and countermeasures. To get the full picture
of how the services operate, I have also included the following columns in the
use case descriptions:
• Brief description
Briefly describes the intention behind the use case and what happens
during the use case.
• Triggers
The event that triggers the use case.
• Pre-conditions
Conditions that need to be satisfied before the use case is started.
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• Post-conditions
Conditions that need to be satisfied after the use case has completed.
• Activities
The sequence of activities that occur during the use case.
• Alternative flows
Flows that deviate from the normal sequence of activities.
• Exception flows
Flows that occur as a result of an exception.
Use Case #1
Title: Import persons
Actor: Consumer of import service
Brief Description: This use case is performed when a consumer invokes the import
service to update the person registries of one or more systems. When updating a
person registry, the import service compares the current list of persons with the new
list submitted by the institution. New persons are added to the registry, persons that
have been changed are updated and persons that are not present in the submitted list
are deactivated. Finally, a summary of the changes made by the import operation
is returned to the consumer.
Triggers: A consumer invokes the import service, submitting a list of persons for
import.
Pre-Conditions:
PRC1: Authentication information for verification of consumers must have been
added to the service.
Post-Conditions:
POC1: A summary of the changes made by the import operation, or alternatively
an error message is returned to the consumer.
Continued on next page
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Table A.1: UC1: Import persons (continued)
Activities:
A1: The consumer invokes the import service with a list of persons.
A2: The import service verifies the identity token and authorizes the consumer.
A3: The import service reads all persons contained in the message received from
the consumer.
A4: The import service groups all persons based on which system they are destined
for.
A5: The import service invokes a given system service, requesting all persons from
the system.
A6: The import service compares the persons received from the institution with the
persons fetched from the system.
A7: The import service adds new persons to the given system by invoking the
system service and supplying a list of persons.
A8: The import service updates changed persons in the given system by invoking
the system service and supplying a list of persons.
A9: The import service deactivates persons that were not present in the list received
from the institution by invoking the system service and supplying a list of persons.
A10: The import service returns a summary of the changes back to the consumer.
A5-A9 are repeated for each system that needs to be updated.
Alternative flows:
AF1: At A6, the import service finds that no changes need to be made for a given
system. The import service skips A7-A9.
Exception flows:
EF1: At A2, the import service is unable to verify the identity token received from
the consumer. The import service returns an error message back to the consumer
explaining the problem.
EF2: At A5, A7, A8 or A9, the import service is unable to communicate with the
system service. The import service returns an error message back to the consumer
explaining the problem.
Continued on next page
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Table A.1: UC1: Import persons (continued)
Threats:
T1: The consumer injects metacharacters along with data. Possible outcomes:
T1-1: Implementation details of the service are revealed to the consumer.
T1-2: Personal data are revealed to the consumer.
T2: The consumer tampers with an identity token before transferring it to the
service. Possible outcomes:
T2-1: The attacker is able to gain unauthorized access to the services.
T3: An outside attacker is eavesdropping on data that is being transferred from the
consumer to the service. Possible outcomes:
T3-1: Personal information is revealed to unauthorized entities.
T4: An outside attacker tampers with data while it is being transferred from the
consumer to the service. Possible outcomes:
T4-1: Unauthorized persons are added to the system registries.
T4-2: Authorized persons are modified or removed from the system registries.
T5: An attacker floods the service with requests. Possible outcomes:
T5-1: The service is overloaded, resulting in denial of service.
Countermeasures:
C1: To counter T1, input from the consumer is validated.
C2: To counter T2, the signature of identity tokens is verified
C3: To counter T3 and T4, a secure channel is used for transferring data.
C4: To counter T5, a firewall is used for limiting access.
C5: To counter T5, load balancing is used to handle a large number of requests.
Use Case #2
Title: Authenticate consumer
Actor: Consumer of security service
Brief Description: This use case is performed when a service consumer wants to
obtain a proof of its identity. The consumer authenticates with the security service
by providing its security credentials, and receives a signed identity token in return.
This token can be used to prove the consumers identity when accessing a service.
This centralizes authentication and authorization, and allows the consumer to use
the same security credentials for accessing multiple services.
Triggers: A consumer invokes the security service, requesting an identity token.
Pre-Conditions:
PRC: An underlying user database or directory service must be configured to com-
municate with the security service.
Post-Conditions:
POC: An identity token or alternatively an error message is returned to the con-
sumer.
Continued on next page
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Table A.2: UC2: Authenticate consumer (continued)
Activities:
A1: The consumer invokes the security service, supplying his/her security creden-
tials.
A2: The security service reads the security credentials of the consumer.
A3: The security service validates the security credentials against the underlying
user database or directory service.
A4: The security service reads the token request from the consumer.
A5: The security service creates an identity token based on the consumer request
and the information that was found.
A6: The security service signs the token as proof that the token was in fact issued
by the security service.
A7: The security service sends token back to the consumer.
Alternative flows: -
Exception flows:
EF1: At A3, the security service cannot find a user that matches the given username
and password. The security service returns an error message back to the consumer
explaining the problem.
Threats:
T1: The consumer injects metacharacters along with data. Possible outcomes:
T1-1: The consumer is able to circumvent authentication.
T1-2: Implementation details of the service are revealed to the consumer.
T2: The consumer tampers with the identity token that is returned from the service.
Possible outcomes:
T2-1: The consumer is able to gain unauthorized access to other services.
T3: An outside attacker captures a message that was sent between the consumer
and the security service and replays it. Possible outcomes:
T3-1: The attacker is able to perform operations on services that he or she is not
authorized to access.
T4: An outside attacker steals an identity token while it is being sent from the
service to the consumer. Possible outcomes:
T4-1: The attacker is able to perform operations on services that he or she is not
authorized to access.
T5: An outside attacker steals a username and password that is being transferred
from the consumer to the service. Possible outcomes:
T5-1: The attacker is able to request an identity token using a stolen username and
password.
T6: An attacker floods the service with requests. Possible outcomes:
T6-1: The service is overloaded, resulting in denial of service.
Countermeasures:
C1: To counter T1, input from the consumer is validated.
C2: To counter T2, data is signed using a digital signature.
C3: To counter T3, T4 and T5, a secure channel is used for transferring data.
C4: To counter T6, a firewall is used for limiting access.
C5: To counter T6, load balancing is used to handle a large number of requests.
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Use Case #3
Title: Add log entry
Actor: Consumer of logging service
Brief Description: This use case is performed when a service consumer wants to
add a log entry to the central log repository. A centralized log repository makes
it easier for an administrator to monitor all services and detect and investigate
potential errors and security problems.
Triggers: A consumer invokes the logging service, requesting that a log entry should
be stored.
Pre-Conditions:
PRC1: An underlying mechanism for logging of events must be configured.
Post-Conditions:
POC1: A status message indicating whether the log event was successfully stored
or not should be returned to the consumer.
Activities:
A1: The consumer invokes the logging service, supplying a log event.
A2: The logging service reads the log event from the message.
A3: The logging service stores the log event using the underlying logging mechanism.
A4: The logging service sends a status message back to the consumer.
Alternative flows: -
Exception flows:
EF1: At A2, the logging service finds a problem when parsing the log message.
The logging service returns an error message back to the consumer explaining the
problem.
Threats:
T1: The consumer injects metacharacters along with data. Possible outcomes:
T1-1: The consumer is able to add logs that is processed in a potentially dangerous
manner by subsystems.
T1-2: Implementation details of the service are revealed to the consumer.
T2: An outside attacker tampers with the log events that are sent from the consumer
to the service. Possible outcomes:
T2-1: The attacker is able to change logs to hide break-ins or attempts thereof.
T3: An outside attacker steals authentication information while it is being sent
from the consumer to the service. Possible outcomes:
T3-1: The attacker is able to add log entries on behalf of the consumer in question.
T4: An outside attacker eavesdrops on log messages. Possible outcomes:
T4-1: Implementation details of the SOA are revealed to the attacker.
T4-2: Sensitive data about persons are revealed to the attacker.
T5: An attacker floods the service with requests. Possible outcomes:
T5-1: The service is overloaded, resulting in denial of service.
Countermeasures:
C1: To counter T1, input from the consumer is validated.
C2: To counter T2, T3 and T4, data is encrypted during transfer.
C3: To counter T5, a firewall is used for limiting access.
C4: To counter T5, load balancing is used to handle a large number of requests.
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Source Code
Due to time constraints, I have not implemented the entire SOA that is designed
in this report. However, I have implemented some examples that show how my
design can be implemented in practice.
The following source code is provided:
• WSDL documents describing all Web Services.
• An input validation interceptor for Apache CXF.
• A SAML interceptor for Apache CXF.
• A Web Services logging appender for Log4J.
• A Spring [39] configuration example for the import service.
B.1 WSDL Documents
As described in section 3.2.2, WSDL documents describe operations, protocols,
and data formats used by a Web Service. In this section, I have provided such
WSDL documents for the import service, security service, and logging service.
Implementation classes of services and consumers can be generated automati-
cally based on these documents by using the wsdl2java tool distributed with
the Apache CXF Web Services framework [4]. Thus, these WSDL documents
are a good starting point for implementing the services and their business logic.
B.1.1 Import Service
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<wsdl:definitions name="ImportService"
targetNamespace="http://uninett.no/fas/ws/importservice"
xmlns:wsdl="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/"
xmlns:tns="http://uninett.no/fas/ws/importservice"
xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/soap/"
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xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema">
<wsdl:types>
<xsd:schema elementFormDefault="unqualified"
attributeFormDefault="unqualified"
targetNamespace="http://uninett.no/fas/ws/importservice"
xmlns:tns="http://uninett.no/fas/ws/importservice"
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema">
<!-- The XML Schema that defines the format of personal data -->
<xsd:include schemaLocation="http://www.uninett.no/trofast/ \
Integrasjon/Importformat.xsd" />
<!-- The results that are sent back to the consumer -->
<xsd:element name="results" type="tns:results" />
<xsd:complexType name="results">
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element ref="tns:result" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded" />
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:element name="result" type="tns:result" />
<xsd:complexType name="result">
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name="personid" type="xsd:string"
minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1" />
<xsd:element name="statusCode" type="xsd:string"
minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1" />
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
</xsd:schema>
</wsdl:types>
<wsdl:message name="persons">
<wsdl:part name="persons" element="tns:persons" />
</wsdl:message>
<wsdl:message name="results">
<wsdl:part name="results" element="tns:results" />
</wsdl:message>
<wsdl:portType name="ImportServicePortType">
<wsdl:operation name="importPersons">
<wsdl:input name="persons" message="tns:persons" />
<wsdl:output name="results" message="tns:results" />
</wsdl:operation>
</wsdl:portType>
<wsdl:binding name="ImportServiceSoapBinding"
type="tns:ImportServicePortType">
<soap:binding style="document"
transport="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/http"/>
<wsdl:operation name="importPersons">
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<soap:operation soapAction="" style="document"/>
<wsdl:input name="persons">
<soap:body use="literal"/>
</wsdl:input>
<wsdl:output name="results">
<soap:body use="literal"/>
</wsdl:output>
</wsdl:operation>
</wsdl:binding>
<wsdl:service name="ImportService">
<wsdl:port name="ImportServicePort"
binding="tns:ImportServiceSoapBinding">
<soap:address location="https://localhost:9091/ImportService"/>
</wsdl:port>
</wsdl:service>
</wsdl:definitions>
Listing B.1: WSDL document describing the import service (importservice.wsdl)
B.1.2 Security Service
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<wsdl:definitions name="SecurityService"
targetNamespace="http://uninett.no/fas/ws/securityservice/"
xmlns:wsdl="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/"
xmlns:tns="http://uninett.no/fas/ws/securityservice/"
xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/soap/"
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:protocol">
<wsdl:types>
<xsd:schema elementFormDefault="unqualified"
attributeFormDefault="unqualified"
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
targetNamespace="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:protocol"
xmlns:tns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:protocol">
<!-- The XML Schema that defines the SAML protocol -->
<xsd:import namespace="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:protocol"
schemaLocation="http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/download.php/ \
3408/oasis-sstc-saml-schema-protocol-1.1.xsd"/>
</xsd:schema>
</wsdl:types>
<wsdl:message name="request">
<wsdl:part name="body" element="samlp:Request" />
</wsdl:message>
<wsdl:message name="response">
<wsdl:part name="body" element="samlp:Response" />
</wsdl:message>
<wsdl:portType name="SecurityServicePortType">
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<wsdl:operation name="invokeRequest">
<wsdl:input name="request" message="tns:request" />
<wsdl:output name="response" message="tns:response" />
</wsdl:operation>
</wsdl:portType>
<wsdl:binding name="SecurityServiceSoapBinding"
type="tns:SecurityServicePortType">
<soap:binding style="document"
transport="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/http"/>
<wsdl:operation name="invokeRequest">
<soap:operation soapAction="" style="document"/>
<wsdl:input name="request">
<soap:body use="literal"/>
</wsdl:input>
<wsdl:output name="response">
<soap:body use="literal"/>
</wsdl:output>
</wsdl:operation>
</wsdl:binding>
<wsdl:service name="SecurityService">
<wsdl:port name="SecurityServicePort"
binding="tns:SecurityServiceSoapBinding">
<soap:address location="http://localhost:9092/SecurityService"/>
</wsdl:port>
</wsdl:service>
</wsdl:definitions>
Listing B.2: WSDL document describing the security service (securityservice.wsdl)
B.1.3 Logging Service
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<wsdl:definitions name="LoggingService"
targetNamespace="http://uninett.no/fas/ws/loggingservice"
xmlns:wsdl="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/"
xmlns:tns="http://uninett.no/fas/ws/loggingservice"
xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/soap/"
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema">
<wsdl:types>
<xsd:schema elementFormDefault="unqualified"
attributeFormDefault="unqualified"
targetNamespace="http://uninett.no/fas/ws/loggingservice"
xmlns:tns="http://uninett.no/fas/ws/loggingservice"
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema">
<!-- The elements used to describe logging events -->
<xsd:complexType name="throwables">
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name="throwableInfo" type="xsd:string"
minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xsd:sequence>
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</xsd:complexType>
<xsd:element name="event" type="tns:event" />
<xsd:complexType name="event">
<xsd:sequence>
<xsd:element name="level" type="xsd:int"
minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1" />
<xsd:element name="localTime" type="xsd:long"
minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1" />
<xsd:element name="hostname" type="xsd:string"
minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1" />
<xsd:element name="logger" type="xsd:string"
minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1" />
<xsd:element name="eventMessage" type="xsd:string"
minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1" />
<xsd:element name="threadName" type="xsd:string"
minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1" />
<xsd:element name="throwables" type="tns:throwables"
minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1" />
</xsd:sequence>
</xsd:complexType>
<!-- The status code that is returned to the consumer -->
<xsd:element name="statusCode" type="xsd:string" />
</xsd:schema>
</wsdl:types>
<wsdl:message name="event">
<wsdl:part name="event" element="tns:event" />
</wsdl:message>
<wsdl:message name="statusCode">
<wsdl:part name="statusCode" element="tns:statusCode" />
</wsdl:message>
<wsdl:portType name="LoggingServicePortType">
<wsdl:operation name="logEvent">
<wsdl:input name="event" message="tns:event" />
<wsdl:output name="statusCode" message="tns:statusCode" />
</wsdl:operation>
</wsdl:portType>
<wsdl:binding name="LoggingServiceSoapBinding"
type="tns:LoggingServicePortType">
<soap:binding style="document"
transport="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/http"/>
<wsdl:operation name="logEvent">
<soap:operation soapAction="" style="document"/>
<wsdl:input name="event">
<soap:body use="literal"/>
</wsdl:input>
<wsdl:output name="statusCode">
<soap:body use="literal"/>
</wsdl:output>
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</wsdl:operation>
</wsdl:binding>
<wsdl:service name="LoggingService">
<wsdl:port name="LoggingServicePort"
binding="tns:LoggingServiceSoapBinding">
<soap:address location="http://localhost:9095/LoggingService"/>
</wsdl:port>
</wsdl:service>
</wsdl:definitions>
Listing B.3: WSDL document describing the logging service (loggingservice.wsdl)
B.2 Input Validation
The data that is received by services should be validated to mitigate metachar-
acter injection. When describing the design of services in the SOA, I have
used a validation interceptor for validating data. This interceptor, named
ValidationInterceptor, makes use of a validation framework by Jensen [18],
and is provided in listing B.4. The ValidationInterceptor may be utilized
for validation by anyone implementing Web Services using the Apache CXF
Web Services framework.
package no.uninett.fas.ws.security;
import java.io.InputStream;
import java.util.HashMap;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.logging.Logger;
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPException;
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPMessage;
import no.fjas.wspv.ConfigParser;
import no.fjas.wspv.ServiceConfig;
import no.fjas.wspv.ValidationException;
import no.fjas.wspv.ValidatorSupport;
import no.fjas.wspv.util.ClassLoaderUtil;
import org.apache.cxf.binding.soap.SoapFault;
import org.apache.cxf.binding.soap.SoapMessage;
import org.apache.cxf.common.i18n.Message;
import org.apache.cxf.common.logging.LogUtils;
import org.apache.cxf.endpoint.Endpoint;
import org.apache.cxf.interceptor.Fault;
import org.apache.cxf.phase.AbstractPhaseInterceptor;
import org.apache.cxf.phase.Phase;
import org.w3c.dom.Document;
/**
* An input validation interceptor for the Apache CXF Web Services framework.
* The interceptor extracts the SOAP body of an incoming message and validates
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* it using the Web Services Payload Validator (no.fjas.wspv) by Henning Jensen.
*
* @author Magne Rodem
*/
public class ValidationInterceptor extends AbstractPhaseInterceptor<SoapMessage>
{
public static final String PROP_CONFIG_FILE = "configFile";
private static final Logger LOG =
LogUtils.getL7dLogger(ValidationInterceptor.class);
private Map<String, Object> properties = new HashMap<String, Object>();
private Map<String, ServiceConfig> globalServiceConfig =
new HashMap<String, ServiceConfig>();
/**
* Reads a set of properties and loads the configuration of the validation
* framework.
*
* @param properties properties that are read by the interceptor
*/
public ValidationInterceptor(Map<String, Object> properties) {
super(Phase.PRE_INVOKE);
this.properties = properties;
loadConfig();
}
private void loadConfig() {
String configFile = (String)properties.get(PROP_CONFIG_FILE);
InputStream is = null;
if (configFile != null) {
is = ClassLoaderUtil.getResourceAsStream(
configFile, ValidationInterceptor.class);
} else {
LOG.warning("Config file not specified.");
}
if (is != null) {
globalServiceConfig = ConfigParser.parseValidatorConfigs(is, configFile);
} else {
LOG.warning("Validation configuration not loaded, " +
"config file not found.");
}
}
/**
* Retrieves the configuration of the service, extracts the body of the
* message and validates it.
*
* @param message the SOAP message that should be validated
*/
public void handleMessage(SoapMessage message) throws Fault {
Endpoint endpoint = message.getExchange().get(Endpoint.class);
String serviceName = endpoint.getService().getName().getLocalPart();
ServiceConfig config = globalServiceConfig.get(serviceName);
SOAPMessage msg = message.getContent(SOAPMessage.class);
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Document doc = null;
try {
doc = msg.getSOAPBody().extractContentAsDocument();
} catch (SOAPException e) {
LOG.warning("Unable to extract SOAP body");
}
try {
ValidatorSupport.validateEnvelope(config, doc);
} catch (ValidationException e) {
throw new SoapFault(new Message("VALIDATION_FAILED", LOG), e,
message.getVersion().getSender());
}
}
}
Listing B.4: An input validation interceptor for the Apache CXF Web Services frame-
work.
B.3 SAML Processing
As mentioned in section 7.3.1, the WSS4JInInterceptor that is included in
Apache CXF does not process the contents of SAML assertions. To do this, we
need an additional interceptor. Listing B.5 contains an interceptor that extracts
authorization information from SAML assertions, and adds this information to
the message context. As a result, the service implementation class is able to
determine whether or not the consumer has been authorized. This interceptor
may be utilized for authorization by anyone implementing Web Services using
the Apache CXF Web Services framework.
package no.uninett.fas.ws.security.saml;
import java.util.Iterator;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Vector;
import java.util.logging.Logger;
import no.uninett.fas.ws.security.SecurityConstants;
import org.apache.cxf.binding.soap.SoapFault;
import org.apache.cxf.binding.soap.SoapMessage;
import org.apache.cxf.common.i18n.Message;
import org.apache.cxf.common.logging.LogUtils;
import org.apache.cxf.interceptor.Fault;
import org.apache.cxf.phase.AbstractPhaseInterceptor;
import org.apache.cxf.phase.Phase;
import org.apache.ws.security.WSSecurityEngineResult;
import org.apache.ws.security.handler.WSHandlerConstants;
import org.apache.ws.security.handler.WSHandlerResult;
import org.opensaml.SAMLAction;
import org.opensaml.SAMLAssertion;
import org.opensaml.SAMLAuthorizationDecisionStatement;
import org.opensaml.SAMLStatement;
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import org.opensaml.SAMLSubject;
/**
* The SAMLInInterceptor parses the content of an incoming SOAP message to
* find a SAML assertion. If an assertion was found, the name, resource, and
* permissions are added to the message context so that the service
* implementation class is able to see that the consumer has been authorized.
*
* @author Magne Rodem
*/
public class SAMLInInterceptor extends AbstractPhaseInterceptor<SoapMessage> {
private static final Logger LOG = LogUtils.getL7dLogger(
SAMLInInterceptor.class);
/**
* Initializes the SAMLInInterceptor.
*/
public SAMLInInterceptor() {
super(Phase.PRE_INVOKE);
}
/**
* Extracts the SAML assertion from the message and adds the authorization
* details of the assertion to the message context.
*
* @param message a SOAP message containing an assertion
*/
public void handleMessage(SoapMessage message) throws Fault {
SAMLAssertion assertion = getAssertion(message);
if (assertion == null) {
throw new SoapFault(new Message("NO_SAML_ASSERTION", LOG),
message.getVersion().getReceiver());
}
setAuthorization(assertion, message);
}
/*
* Searches the Security header and extracts a SAMLAssertion instance.
*/
private SAMLAssertion getAssertion(SoapMessage message) {
List<Object> results = (Vector<Object>)message.get(
WSHandlerConstants.RECV_RESULTS);
SAMLAssertion assertion = null;
for (Object result : results) {
if (result instanceof WSHandlerResult) {
List<Object> wsHndlResults = ((WSHandlerResult)result).getResults();
for (Object wsHndlResult : wsHndlResults) {
if (wsHndlResult instanceof WSSecurityEngineResult) {
WSSecurityEngineResult wsEngineResult =
((WSSecurityEngineResult)wsHndlResult);
assertion = (SAMLAssertion)wsEngineResult.get(
WSSecurityEngineResult.TAG_SAML_ASSERTION);
}
}
}
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}
return assertion;
}
/*
* Finds the authorization details of the assertion and adds it to
* the message context.
*/
private void setAuthorization(SAMLAssertion assertion, SoapMessage message) {
SAMLAuthorizationDecisionStatement authzStm = null;
Iterator it = assertion.getStatements();
while (it.hasNext()) {
SAMLStatement st = (SAMLStatement)it.next();
if (st instanceof SAMLAuthorizationDecisionStatement) {
authzStm = (SAMLAuthorizationDecisionStatement)st;
break;
}
}
SAMLSubject subject = authzStm.getSubject();
String nameId = subject.getNameIdentifier().getName();
String resource = authzStm.getResource();
String actions = (String)message.get(SecurityConstants.PERMISSIONS);
Iterator acIt = authzStm.getActions();
while (acIt.hasNext()) {
SAMLAction ac = (SAMLAction)acIt.next();
if (actions == null || actions.equals("")) {
actions = ac.getData();
} else {
actions += " " + ac.getData();
}
}
message.put(SecurityConstants.USERID, nameId);
message.put(SecurityConstants.RESOURCE, resource);
message.put(SecurityConstants.PERMISSIONS, actions);
LOG.info("SAML authorization: " + nameId + " has been given " +
"permissions ’" + actions + "’ on " + resource);
}
}
Listing B.5: An interceptor for the Apache CXF Web Services framework that extracts
authorization information from SAML assertions.
B.4 Logging Appender
The SOA that has been designed in this report uses a logging service for cen-
tralized handling of logs. As described in section 7.2.4, I have used the Log4J
logging framework to realize this functionality. By configuring Log4J to use
specific appenders, logging events may be logged in different ways. To be able
to send log messages to a Web Service, a custom appender need to be imple-
mented and configured. Listing B.6 contains an appender that sends log events
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to the central logging service.
package no.uninett.fas.ws;
import java.net.InetAddress;
import no.uninett.fas.ws.loggingservice.Event;
import no.uninett.fas.ws.loggingservice.Throwables;
import org.apache.log4j.AppenderSkeleton;
import org.apache.log4j.spi.LoggingEvent;
/**
* The WebServiceLogAppender is a Log4J appender that invokes a Web Service
* to log an event. The URL of the logging service is specified in the
* log4j.xml configuration file as follows:
*
* <pre>
* <appender name="webservice" class="no.uninett.fas.ws.WebServiceLogAppender">
* <param name="Url" value="https://localhost:9095/LoggingService" />
* </appender>
* </pre>
*
* @author Magne Rodem
*/
public class WebServiceLogAppender extends AppenderSkeleton {
private LoggingClient client = null;
private String url = null;
/**
* Indicates whether or not this appender must have a layout associated
* with it.
*
* @return boolean whether or not this appender needs a layout
*/
public boolean requiresLayout() {
return false;
}
/**
* Sets the URL of the logging service. This method is normally called by
* the Log4J framework depending on what is configured in log4j.xml.
*
* @param url the URL of the logging service
*/
public void setUrl(String url) {
this.url = url;
}
/**
* Invokes a logging service to append a new log message.
*
* @param event the logging event that is going to be logged
*/
public synchronized void append(LoggingEvent event) {
Event ev = new Event();
ev.setLevel(event.getLevel().toInt());
ev.setLocalTime(System.currentTimeMillis());
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ev.setThreadName(event.getThreadName());
ev.setLogger(event.getLoggerName());
ev.setEventMessage(event.getRenderedMessage());
String[] thrInfo = event.getThrowableStrRep();
if (thrInfo != null) {
Throwables tables = new Throwables();
for (String info : thrInfo) {
tables.getThrowableInfo().add(info);
}
ev.setThrowables(tables);
}
if (client == null) {
client = new LoggingClient(url);
}
Object[] response = null;
try {
ev.setHostname(InetAddress.getLocalHost().getCanonicalHostName());
response = client.invoke("logEvent", ev);
if (response == null || !response.equals("success")) {
throw new Exception("Bad response from logging service!");
}
} catch (Exception e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
/**
* Closes the Web Service client.
*/
public void close() {
client.getClient().destroy();
}
}
Listing B.6: A Log4J appender that invokes a Web Service to log an event.
B.5 Service Configuration
A lot has been said about interceptors in this report, and how they allow us
to handle security outside of business operations. How are these interceptors
configured in practice? The configuration of the import service is shown in
listing B.7. The Spring framework [39] allows us to configure interceptors in
an XML configuration file. This results in loose coupling between the service
implementation class and interceptors.
<beans xmlns="http://www.springframework.org/schema/beans"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xmlns:sec="http://cxf.apache.org/configuration/security"
xmlns:jaxws="http://cxf.apache.org/jaxws"
xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.springframework.org/schema/beans
http://www.springframework.org/schema/beans/spring-beans-2.0.xsd
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http://cxf.apache.org/configuration/security
http://cxf.apache.org/schemas/configuration/security.xsd
http://cxf.apache.org/jaxws http://cxf.apache.org/schemas/jaxws.xsd">
<!--
Configures the import service by specifying the implementation class,
location of the WSDL document, and the address where the service should be
made available.
-->
<jaxws:endpoint
id="ImportService"
implementor="no.uninett.fas.ws.importservice.ImportServiceImpl"
wsdlLocation="no/uninett/fas/ws/importservice/importservice.wsdl"
address="/ImportService">
<!--
Specifies inbound interceptors for this service.
-->
<jaxws:inInterceptors>
<!--
Interceptor for input validation. Reads the validation configuration
to find out what values are allowed for individual elements, and
validates incoming data.
-->
<bean class="no.uninett.fas.ws.security.ValidationInterceptor">
<constructor-arg>
<map>
<entry key="configFile"
value="no/uninett/fas/ws/importservice/validation.xml" />
</map>
</constructor-arg>
</bean>
<!--
Interceptor for WS-Security processing. WSS4JInInterceptor depends
on SAAJInInterceptor to be able to process security info. The WSS4J
interceptor is configured to validate the signature of the message.
The keystore containing trusted keys are specified in sign.properties.
In addition, SAMLTokenUnsigned indicates that the service should
check that a SAML assertion is present.
-->
<bean class="org.apache.cxf.binding.soap.saaj.SAAJInInterceptor"/>
<bean class="org.apache.cxf.ws.security.wss4j.WSS4JInInterceptor">
<constructor-arg>
<map>
<entry key="action" value="Signature SAMLTokenUnsigned"/>
<entry key="signaturePropFile"
value="no/uninett/fas/ws/importservice/sign.properties" />
</map>
</constructor-arg>
</bean>
<!--
Interceptor used for processing SAML assertions. Authorization
information contained in the assertion is extracted and added to
the message context. This way, the service implementation class
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is able to see that the consumer has been authorized.
-->
<bean class="no.uninett.fas.ws.security.saml.SAMLInInterceptor"/>
</jaxws:inInterceptors>
</jaxws:endpoint>
</beans>
Listing B.7: A Spring [39] configuration file that configures the import service.
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